






Does the stock market make firms more productive?   
 







Management, directly or indirectly, learns from its firm’s stock price, so a more informative stock 
price should make the firm more productive. We show that stock price informativeness increases 
firm productivity. We provide direct evidence of one channel through which stock price 
informativeness affects productivity; specifically, we find that CEO turnover is less sensitive to 
Tobin’s q when informativeness is lower. We predict and confirm that the productivity of smaller 
and younger firms, better governed firms, more specialized firms, and firms with more 
competition is more strongly related to the informativeness of their stock price. We further 
address endogeneity concerns with the use of brokerage closures, S&P 500 additions, and mutual 
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One important role of the stock market is to provide price discovery (e.g., Bond, Edmans, and 
Goldstein, 2012; Fama and Miller, 1972; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Dow and Gorton, 1997; 
Dow and Rahi, 2003). Investors and managers learn from stock prices. It is well established that the 
quality of price discovery varies across stocks and stock markets (see, for instance, Morck, Yeung, and 
Yu, 2013). In this paper, we use differences in the quality of price discovery across US firms to 
investigate whether better price discovery makes firms more productive and whether it does so 
differentially across firms. After demonstrating that better stock market price discovery makes firms 
more productive, we show that the relation between the quality of stock price discovery and productivity 
varies across firms in predictable ways.    
Consider two firms. One firm’s stock moves exactly with the market, so no firm-specific 
information is incorporated in the price. The other firm’s stock price incorporates a large amount of 
firm-specific information. With the first stock, management and investors learn nothing from price 
moves that they would not learn by looking at a market index. In the other case, the stock price has 
information about the firm that is separate from information about the market. Some of that information 
results from trading by investors (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 
1985). The contention and evidence in the literature is that this information is valuable to management 
and investors in guiding their actions. In the case of the first firm, a drop in the stock price is not 
informative about firm-specific developments; in the case of the second firm, it is.  
Once private information is in the stock price, it informs the actions of managers and investors in 
many ways. For example, corporate managers can learn from the information in stock prices for mergers 
& acquisitions (M&A) decisions: if a firm’s stock price drops after an M&A announcement, the 
manager may cancel the planned acquisition (Luo, 2005), the acquirer may itself be taken over (Mitchell 
and Lehn, 1990), or the CEO may lose her job (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). In addition to management, 
directors and activists can take actions to force changes in how firms are managed, and investors in 
general can take market-based corrective actions (Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott, 2010). Further, 
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managerial incentives typically depend directly on stock prices. Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) 
review the theoretical and empirical literature on the real effects of price discovery.   
There is considerable variation in productivity across firms. Syverson (2004) finds that, within an 
industry, a plant at the 90th percentile of the total factor productivity (TFP) distribution produces almost 
twice as much as a plant at the 10th percentile of the TFP distribution with the same inputs. Considerable 
research effort has been devoted to try to explain this cross-sectional variation, but this research effort 
has not examined how productivity is affected by price discovery in the stock market. A growing 
literature examines how the quality of stock price discovery affects firm policies. Perhaps the best 
known results concern the relation between investment efficiency and price discovery (e.g., Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Edmans, 
Jayaraman, and Schneemeier, 2017). We call this channel the investment channel of informativeness. 
Since productivity measures take inputs as given, there is no necessary relation between investment 
decisions that affect firm inputs and firm productivity. For instance, a firm that invests more could 
simply scale its operations with no changes in productivity.  
We find evidence that greater investment efficiency resulting from greater price discovery impacts 
firm productivity positively, but the investment channel explains only a small fraction of the impact of 
informativeness on productivity. We also provide direct evidence that price discovery affects 
productivity through other channels than investment. In particular, we show that CEO turnover is more 
sensitive to firm value in firms with more informative stock prices. In addition, we find that firms with 
more informative stock prices have higher revenues, lower operating costs (SG&A), and lower labor 
expenses.  
The extent to which trading incorporates private information in stock prices is measured in the 
literature by a stock’s price informativeness (SPI). Throughout the paper, we highlight results using the 
two measures of SPI that are most widely used in the literature, the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) and stock price nonsynchronicity (PSI), but we also establish that our results hold for other 
measures. PIN measures the probability of informed trading in a stock (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 
2002). This measure has a micro foundation, as it is based on a structural market microstructure model. 
PSI measures firm-specific return variation. Initiated by Roll (1988), the logic of this measure is to filter 
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out the market and industry-related components from stock returns. As a firm’s idiosyncratic variation 
increases, the stock price reflects more private information (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung, 2004). 
We use TFP as our main measure of productivity. TFP measures the overall effectiveness and 
efficiency with which capital and labor are used in the production process. Keeping capital and labor 
inputs fixed, a firm with higher TFP produces more. To measure TFP at the firm level, we have to 
estimate a production function with data available from Compustat. To do so, we follow Ackerberg, 
Caves, and Frazer (2015). Many results in the productivity literature are insensitive to measurement 
choices (Syverson, 2011), but nevertheless we also use another TFP measure from Chun, Kim, and 
Morck (2011) and other measures of firm efficiency from the corporate finance literature. We show that 
these measures are positively related with SPI as well.  
Our evidence that firms with better price discovery in the stock market are more productive could 
be explained by factors that influence both price discovery and firm productivity. For example, one 
potential omitted factor could be technology shocks, which may lead to higher price informativeness 
and higher productivity (Chun et al., 2008; Chun, Kim, and Morck, 2011). To make a causal 
interpretation of our results plausible, we address potential endogeneity concerns in multiple ways. 
First, we provide difference-in-differences (DiD) estimations using quasi-natural experiments of shocks 
to SPI. The first experiment involves closures of brokerage research departments, and the second 
experiment uses additions to the S&P 500 index. Second, we use mutual fund flow pressure as an 
exogenous shock to price informativeness and show that a decrease in price informativeness leads to 
lower productivity. Third, we control for firm fixed effects to minimize the possibility that time-
invariant firm-specific omitted variables are affecting our results. Fourth, we use a moving average of 
SPI over the previous three years, which helps alleviate simultaneity and reverse causality concerns.  
Our results are robust to these approaches to address endogeneity concerns and hence provide strong 
support for the existence of a causal effect of SPI on TFP.  
To investigate the mechanism through which price informativeness affects productivity, we use 
mutual fund redemptions and brokerage house closures as exogenous shocks to stock price 
informativeness and study its effects on the sensitivity of CEO turnover decisions to Tobin’s q. Mutual 
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fund redemptions bring downward pressure to the price of affected stocks and have little to do with firm 
fundamentals (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012; Dessaint et al., 2019).  
This fits well with the intuition that price becomes less informative because the variation in stock price 
does not reveal information on firm fundamentals. More specifically, these fund flow events increase 
the fraction of noise trading driven by liquidity reasons (funds’ fire sales), and they can discourage 
investors from collecting information on firm fundamentals because information collection is costly but 
less likely to be used for trading when the stock price is mainly driven by non-fundamental factors. 
We find that, after a firm experiences mutual fund flow pressure, its CEO turnover decision is less 
sensitive to Tobin’s q (i.e., less sensitive to market valuation). When the stock price becomes less 
informative due to the fund flow pressure, we would expect the firm’s board to put less weight on firm 
value when evaluating the CEO. If a CEO’s bad performance is disguised by fund flow pressure, 
keeping the incumbent CEO in the position has negative effects on firm productivity. Similarly, the 
tests based on brokerage house closures also show that a decrease in price informativeness has a 
negative effect on the turnover sensitivity to q. These results illustrate one concrete channel through 
which stock price informativeness affects firm productivity. 
We expect the strength of the relation between SPI and TFP to vary depending on firm 
characteristics. First, the relation should be weaker for larger firms. Holmstrom (1989) argues that larger 
firms are more bureaucratic, which increases adjustment costs for these firms. We find that the relation 
between SPI and TFP is weaker but still holds for larger firms. Second, we expect older firms to adjust 
more slowly as well, as they have developed more formal processes to manage their operations and are 
more hierarchical (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2016). We hypothesize that it is more difficult for 
investors and managers to extract information from the stock price of more complex firms. Evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is, for instance, that analyst forecast errors fall as firms become more focused 
(Gilson et al., 2001). Using firm-level diversification as an index of complexity, we find that the impact 
of SPI on TFP is weaker for diversified firms. Firms with riskier businesses are less certain about their 
internal information, and therefore their decisions should rely relatively more on the information in their 
stock price. Our results pertaining to business risk support this prediction.  
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Economic theory suggests that the incentives of firms to use stock price information depend on 
their financial situation and on the environment they are in. Financially constrained firms have strong 
incentives to allocate resources efficiently to relax their financial constraints, but these constraints may 
prevent them from implementing changes that require funding. Consequently, whether financially 
constrained firms make more use of stock price discovery is an empirical matter. We find that the impact 
of SPI on TFP is stronger for financially constrained firms for some specifications and is never weaker. 
Firms that operate in a more competitive environment have stronger incentives to make the best use of 
their resources, as they operate with little slack (e.g., Hart, 1983). We find that the impact of SPI on 
TFP is stronger for such firms. Lastly, better corporate governance should provide stronger incentives 
for management to operate the firm more efficiently, so the impact of SPI on TFP should be stronger 
for firms that have better governance. Our evidence is supportive of that prediction.  
Our contributions are as follows. First, the paper adds to the literature on corporate productivity. 
We provide evidence that stock price informativeness has a positive effect on firms’ TFP. Second, we 
show that the impact of SPI on TFP depends on firm characteristics. We find that the impact falls with 
firm size, age, and complexity; it increases with competition, financial constraints, and governance. 
Third, our paper adds to the literature on the effect of financial markets on the real economy. There is 
a large literature on whether the stock market is a sideshow. The results of this literature are mixed. For 
instance, David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2016) recently conclude from a calibration exercise 
that learning from financial markets contributes little to aggregate resource allocation. Fourth, our paper 
contributes to the literature that assesses the benefits and costs of exchange listings for corporations. 
Our findings are consistent with a role of the stock market in providing information to investors and 
managers that helps make firms more productive. Importantly, the role we show the stock market 
playing does not rely on the stock market being a net provider of funds to the corporate sector or funding 
new firms.   
Section 2 reviews the related literature and motivates our tests. Section 3 introduces the measures 
of stock price informativeness. Section 4 describes the data sources and the sample. Section 5 provides 
our evidence on the impact of SPI on TFP and addresses potential endogeneity concerns. Section 6 
shows the channels through which SPI impacts productivity. Section 7 investigates the cross-sectional 
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variation in the impact of SPI on TFP. Section 8 provides evidence that SPI affects other measures of 
firm efficiency. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this section, we first review the literature on the real effects of financial markets and then briefly 
motivate our empirical tests in light of the literature. 
 
2.1. Review of existing literature  
There has been a noticeable increase in the attention paid by research in financial economics on the 
real effects of financial markets on the economy. Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) review the 
literature on the real effects of price discovery. They argue that financial markets have real effects 
because they affect the actions of decision-makers in the economy, and such effects originate from the 
informational role of prices. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013) provide a summary of the research on the 
effects of firm-specific information in stock prices on the efficiency of the economy. Wurgler (2000) 
finds that firm-specific information in stock prices is positively correlated with the country-level 
efficiency of capital allocation. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that firm-specific return variation 
differs across countries and it is higher in developed markets than in emerging markets. Bai, Philippon, 
and Savov (2016) conclude that stock price informativeness has increased in the US since 1960. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) find enforcement of insider trading laws improves price informativeness 
in developed countries. 
The idea that price has an informational role can be traced back to Hayek (1945), who argues that 
prices can efficiently summarize useful knowledge and spread information through society. Fama and 
Miller (1972) argue that market prices of securities provide signals for resource allocation, and firms 
can use them to make production-investment decisions. Dow and Gorton (1997) study the link between 
stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency through a theoretical model in which 
managers can learn from stock prices to make better investments. Their model has two equilibria. In 
one equilibrium, the information in stock prices guides investment decisions, but in the other 
7 
 
equilibrium it does not. Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) provide a theoretical model that shows 
economic agents take corrective actions based on the information in market prices of a firm’s securities. 
There is also empirical evidence showing that price discovery in the stock market affects firms’ 
decisions. One branch of the research focuses on the effects of stock price informativeness on firms’ 
investment efficiency. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) show that more informative stock prices 
facilitate more efficient investment. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that the sensitivity of 
investment to price (or Tobin’s q) is stronger when firms’ stock price is more informative. Bakke and 
Whited (2010) also provide evidence that managers learn from stock prices when making investment 
decisions. Foucault and Frésard (2012) show that cross-listing a stock increases the firm’s sensitivity of 
investment to price. Edmans, Jayaraman, and Schneemeier (2017) carry out an international study in 
which they use the enforcement of insider trading laws as an exogenous shock to price informativeness 
and find enforcement increases investment-q sensitivity. Foucault and Frésard (2014) find that a firm’s 
stock price informativeness can have a spillover effect on its rivals’ investment decisions. 
Existing studies also investigate how stock price discovery affects other corporate decisions besides 
investment. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) theoretically study the relation between stock price 
efficiency and firms’ going-public decisions. Luo (2005) finds that firms learn from market reactions 
to M&A announcements and what they learn affects their decision of whether to complete M&A deals. 
Jin and Myers (2006) show that lower price informativeness shifts firm-specific risk to managers and 
firms with a less informative stock price are more likely to experience large negative returns. Ferreira 
and Laux (2007) find that firm-specific return variation is positively correlated with corporate 
governance quality. Gorton, Huang, and Kang (2017) provide evidence that the board’s monitoring 
effort has a negative effect on information production. Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) find a 
negative relation between price informativeness and board independence. Frésard (2012) shows that 
stock price informativeness increases the sensitivity of cash saving to Tobin’s q. De Cesari and Huang-
Meier (2015) demonstrate that price informativeness increases the sensitivity of dividend changes to 




Although there is research about the effects of price informativeness on different individual corporate 
decisions, there is no direct evidence on whether higher price informativeness improves firms’ 
productivity. Such evidence is important for our understanding of the real effects of financial markets. 
One might think that if price informativeness improves the efficiency of some specific firm decisions, 
it also improves firms’ productivity. This may not be the case. For example, if a manager learns from 
its stock price that there is a larger demand for her firm’s products, she then invests more so that she 
can produce more goods. However, an investment increase may decrease productivity, leave it 
unchanged, or increase it depending on the nature of the investment and of the production function of 
the firm. In fact, there is no empirical study that provides direct evidence on the impact of price 
discovery on productivity. The only work we are aware of that bears on this issue is a calibration 
exercise in David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2016) that is focused on investment and concludes 
that learning from financial markets contributes little to productivity. Our paper provides direct 
evidence that price discovery in the stock market improves firm’s productivity. 
There are different measures for the informativeness of stock prices in the literature. Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu (2000) propose a measure using firm-specific return variation based on R2 (Roll, 1988). Easley 
et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) develop a measure for the probability of 
informed trading (PIN). These measures have been widely used in studies of the impact of stock price 
informativeness. Llorente, Michaely, and Wang (2002) construct a measure for the amount of trading-
based information in stock prices called Gamma. Duarte and Young (2009) refine PIN by removing the 
liquidity component of PIN so that only the portion related to asymmetric information remains.  
TFP is the most widely used measure for productivity. It measures the portion of output that is not 
explained by inputs of capital and labor. Some research uses plant-level data to calculate the 
corresponding TFP (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Giroud and Mueller, 2015). This plant-level 
TFP makes it possible to study the productivity of different plants within a firm. However, our research 
question is to study how stock price informativeness affects productivity, and individual plants do not 
have their own stocks. Imrohoroğlu, and Tüzel (2014) use a firm-level TFP to study the link between 
firm-level productivity and stock returns. We use a firm-level TFP calculated using a more recent 




2.2. Theoretical motivation for our tests 
With q theory, investment is related to Tobin’s q, which depends on the stock price. Hence, there 
is a direct relation between the stock price and investment. The motivation for tests that assess the 
impact of informativeness on investment decisions is that managers put more weight on the stock price 
in their decisions when the stock price incorporates more firm-specific information. More generally, 
however, when management, the board, or investors are imperfectly informed when taking decisions, 
they will use a firm’s stock price if the stock price is a signal that is correlated with the value to them 
of taking a decision. In a Bayesian framework, the weight economic agents put on the stock price when 
a decision is taken depends on how informative the stock price is. Hence, if the stock price is not 
informative, they will ignore it, but if it is informative, it will affect their decision as long as the stock 
price is a useful signal for that decision.  
Note that even if managers do not take into account the stock price directly, they may take it into 
account indirectly because it influences the board or other shareholders. It follows that stock price 
changes can have a direct impact on managerial decisions because management pays attention to stock 
prices, or an indirect impact because stock prices affect the actions of shareholders and the board. We 
would expect the impact to increase with the extent to which the stock price has information that 
managers would not have otherwise, which means that the impact increases with the informativeness 
of the stock price.     
There are countless decisions that are made concerning a firm that are potentially affected by the 
stock price. For instance, firm decisions to issue securities depend on the stock price (Eckbo, Masulis, 
and Norli, 2007); managerial compensation contracts often depend in varying ways on the firm’s stock 
price (e.g., Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Bennett et al., 2019); managerial turnover decisions are affected 
by the stock price (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988); and so on. A vast literature in finance reaches 
conclusions about firm policies and managerial performance based on comparison of a firm’s stock 
price to the stock price of other firms. Reactions of the stock market to firm decisions are the object of 
event studies, but they are also the object of attention from managers, board members, and investors. 
At times, firms change decisions based on the reaction of the stock market or take decisions because 
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they expect the stock market to react favorably to them. Shareholders react to firm decisions and as a 
result may choose to sell shares.  
Those who argue that the stock market signals hurt the economy because they lead managers to 
take actions that boost the stock price quickly at the expense of long-term wealth creation would not be 
surprised by evidence that management responds to stock market signals (e.g., Foroohar, 2016). The 
key issue is whether these signals improve welfare. To resolve this question, one would want to see 
evidence that stock market signals have a real impact rather than an impact on stock market metrics. If 
the stock market leads to poor allocation of resources, then it must be rewarding poor allocation of 
resources. The use of productivity as a metric has the advantage of being a summary measure of firm 
efficiency that does not depend on stock market valuations.   
Even if the stock market’s signals lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, it does not follow 
from the fact that if a firm pays attention to the stock price, then its actions will increase productivity. 
With constant returns to scale, for instance, a firm that increases its scale would not become more 
productive. Hence, whether information in the stock price leads firms to become more productive is an 
empirical question. However, while investment decisions often affect the scale of operations, many 
other decisions do not affect the scale of operations but rather the efficiency of operations. It follows 
that decisions other than investment decisions may be more likely to have an impact on productivity. 
For instance, the decision to fire a CEO is likely to depend in part on the stock price. We would expect 
such a decision, in general, to improve the operations of the firm if taken.    
  
3. Measures of stock price informativeness 
We highlight the results using two measures of stock price informativeness, which are annual 
measures based on stock trades or daily stock returns, but also show results using other measures. The 
first measure is the probability of information-based trading (PIN), which follows from a market 
microstructure model (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002). The logic is that, when there is more 
informed trading in a stock, new information is more likely to be incorporated into that stock’s price, 
which improves the stock’s price informativeness. High PIN means high SPI. The second measure is 
the stock’s price nonsynchronicity (PSI), which captures the firm-specific stock return variation 
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(Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004). The logic is that, when there is more firm-specific information in 
the stock price, the stock return is less correlated with market and industry returns. High PSI means 
high stock price informativeness. Both measures are widely used as stock price informativeness 
measures in the literature.1 
 
3.1. Probability of information-based trading (PIN) 
PIN measures the probability of information-based trading. Suppose that on a day new information 
appears with probability 𝛼, with probability 𝛿 the news is bad, and with probability 1 − 𝛿, the news is 
good. The probability of no news on a day is 1 − 𝛼. The trading orders follow Poisson distributions. 
Uninformed traders trade irrespective of whether new information arrives or not. The arrival rate of 
uninformed buy (sell) orders is 𝑏( 𝑠). The traders with private information only trade when there is 
new information, and the arrival rate is 𝜇. The informed trader will only buy if the news is good and 
only sell if the news is bad. Given these parameters (𝛼, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑏 , 𝑠), the probability of information-based 
trading is  
PIN =
α ⋅ μ
α ⋅ μ + (εb + εs)
,                                                                      (1) 
where the denominator is the arrival rate for all orders and the numerator is the arrival rate of informed 
orders. 
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. On day i, we observe the number of buy 




, where 𝑘 is the number of arrivals and 𝜆 is the arrival rate. The likelihood of information-based 
trading on a given trading day is  
L(α, δ, μ, εb, εs|B𝑖, S𝑖) = (1 − α) ⋅ P(B𝑖; εb) ⋅ P(S𝑖; εs) + α ⋅ δ ⋅ P(B𝑖; εb) ⋅ P(S𝑖; μ + εs) 
+α ⋅ (1 − δ) ⋅ P(B𝑖; μ + εb) ⋅ P(S𝑖; εs).                                                    (2) 
Assuming that trading activity across days is independently distributed, the likelihood function 
within a year is  
                                                          
1 For example, see Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011). 
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V = ∏ L(α, δ, μ, εb, εs|B𝑖, S𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
,                                                      (3) 
where 𝐼 is the number of trading days in a year. 
Based on trade and quote (TAQ) data and the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, we calculate the 
number of daily buy and sell orders for a stock. We then use maximum likelihood to calculate the 
parameters (𝛼, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑏 , 𝑠) based on the data in a year. In turn, PIN is calculated for a stock in a given 
year.  
 
3.2. Stock price nonsynchronicity (𝑃𝑆𝐼) 
The stock price nonsynchronicity, PSI, is a measure of stock price informativeness based on the R2 
from asset pricing regressions, following Roll (1988) and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). We 
decompose the stock return into the systematic part explained by the market return and industry return 
and firm-specific residual variation. When there is relatively more firm-specific variation, the return co-
moves less with the market return and the industry return, so R2 is smaller. To perform our 
decomposition, we use the following linear regression: 
r𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = β𝑗,0 + β𝑗,𝑚r𝑚,𝑡 + β𝑗,𝑖r𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,                                               (4) 
where j is for firm j, i is for industry i, and t is for day t, r𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return of firm j in industry i 
defined at the three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) on day t,  r𝑚,𝑡 is the value weighted 
market return on day t, and r𝑖,𝑡 is the value weighted industry return on day t. The weights are based on 
market capitalization. When calculating the market and industry value weighted returns for firm j, the 
return of firm j is excluded to prevent spurious correlations between firm and industry returns in 
industries that contain few firms.  
The regression is estimated for each firm j within a year, and the R2 of the regression is used to 
construct PSI𝑗 for stock j in a given year as follows:  




2 ).                                                                      (5) 
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In the above equation, PSI𝑗 is transformed to address the skewness and boundedness of 1 − R𝑗
2 (Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu, 2000). The stock price is more informative when a stock becomes less correlated with 
the market and industry returns (i.e., when R𝑗
2 falls and hence PSI𝑗 increases). 
 
3.3. Additional measures of stock price informativeness 
Besides PIN and PSI, we also investigate the relation between SPI and TFP using two additional 
SPI measures: Gamma and Adjusted PIN. Gamma measures the amount of trading-based information 
in stock prices. It is originally constructed by Llorente, Michaely, and Wang (2002) and used by Frésard 
(2012) and Foucault and Frésard (2014). We apply two versions of Gamma. The first version follows 
Llorente, Michaely, and Wang (2002) and Frésard (2012), in which both the firm stock return and the 
market return are controlled for in the calculation of Gamma. We denote this version as 
Gamma(Market). The second version follows an original design by Llorente, Michaely, and Wang 
(2002), in which only the firm stock return is controlled for in the calculation of Gamma. We denote 
this version as Gamma(No market). Duarte and Young (2009) develop Adjusted PIN, which we denote 
by APIN. APIN refines PIN by removing the liquidity component of PIN so that only the portion related 
to asymmetric information remains. 
 
4. Data and sample 
Our firm-level accounting data are from Compustat. We use TAQ data to calculate PIN and the 
daily stock file from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate PSI. Mutual fund 
data are from the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings database and CRSP mutual fund database.  
Institutional ownership and blockholder data are from Thomson-Reuters 13F. CEO turnover data are 
from ExecuComp. Corporate governance related data are from RiskMetrics. The product market 
competition variables we use are from the Hoberg-Phillips data library.2  
                                                          




Our sample only includes firms with nonmissing accounting data and nonmissing stock price 
informativeness (we require at least one of PIN or PSI for a firm-year to be included in our sample). 
PIN is first available in 1993, as that is the first year TAQ data are available.  In our analysis, we use 
the average PIN and PSI over the previous three years (we require at least one nonmissing value in the 
previous three years). We use a backward-looking approach to help alleviate reverse causality concerns. 
Our sample is from 1994 to 2015 and includes 66,341 firm-year observations. 
Our main dependent variable is TFP. TFP measures the overall effectiveness and efficiency with 
which capital and labor are used in the production process.  We estimate the production function 
following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). Compared with earlier methods (Olley and Pakes, 
1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) address the functional 
dependence problem and estimate all input coefficients in the second stage of the estimation. The 
detailed description of our method to estimate TFP can be found in Appendix B. 
The control variables used in our main tests are the natural logarithm of total assets, Tobin’s q, cash 
scaled by assets, debt scaled by assets, and research & development (R&D) scaled by assets. The 
definitions for all variables can be found in Appendix A. The summary statistics of our main variables 
are reported in Table 1. The mean values of our SPI variables, PIN and PSI, are 0.22 and 2.22, 
respectively, which are in line with previous studies.3 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
In this section, we first present our baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. We then turn 
to various approaches to account for endogeneity.  
 
5.1. Baseline regressions 
If more informative stock prices help make firms more productive, we should find a positive relation 
between TFP and SPI. Our baseline regression specification regresses TFP on lagged average SPI and 
controls for firm characteristics, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects:  
                                                          
3 See Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011). 
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𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                              (6) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1  stands for the measure of stock price 
informativeness, which is the average of the previous three years,4 X is the vector of control variables, 
Γ is the coefficient vector for the control variables, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, 
and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The results are reported in Table 2.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for our main SPI measures, PIN and PSI. Models 1 and 3 use 
PIN as the SPI measure. Model 1 controls for firm size and Tobin’s q. Model 3 also includes cash 
holdings, leverage, and R&D as control variables. We use the full list of control variables in Model 3 
in the remainder of the paper. We include firm fixed effects to minimize potential issues related to time-
invariant firm-specific omitted variables. Estimated coefficients on PIN are positive and highly 
significant in both models (t-statistics above 8). Models 2 and 4 use PSI as the SPI measure. The results 
are consistent with those using PIN. The economic effects are also significant. One standard deviation 
increase in PIN (PSI) leads to a 5% (5%) TFP increase in standard deviation units, based on the results 
in Models 3 (4).  
When we use PSI as the measure of SPI, we can have a longer sample period because its calculation 
relies on the CRSP daily stock files. Model 5 estimates Model 4 from 1962 to 2015. The coefficient on 
PSI is significantly positive, but its economic magnitude is lower. 
The literature has documented that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to Tobin’s q increases 
with SPI (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007). The literature has not explored whether the greater 
sensitivity of investment to q due to higher SPI leads to a greater impact of investment on TFP. To 
assess the importance of this investment channel for our results, we reestimate Models 3 and 4, adding 
investment variables. These variables are capital expenditures divided by assets, the capital 
expenditures sensitivity to Tobin’s q (investment-q sensitivity), and the interaction between the capital 
expenditures sensitivity to Tobin’s q and capital expenditures.5 We find that the SPI coefficients are 
                                                          
4 In unreported tests, we also use the average SPI of the previous two or four years. Our results remain strong 
and are not sensitive to the time window for the average. 
5 A firm’s capital expenditures sensitivity to Tobin’s q is calculated by regressing capital expenditures (scaled by 
total assets) on lagged Tobin’s q, logarithm of total assets, and cash flows in a five-year rolling window. The 
coefficient of Tobin’s q is the capital expenditures sensitivity to Tobin’s q (investment-q sensitivity or IQS). The 
potential measurement error in q is addressed by using the approach of Erickson and Whited (2000). 
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largely unchanged, which suggest that the contribution of the investment channel to our results is 
limited. Nevertheless, the interaction of investment efficiency with the level of capital expenditures is 
positive in both models and significant in Model 7, so there is evidence that investment by firms with 
higher SPI is associated with higher productivity. In other words, investment contributes more to 
productivity when it is made by a firm with better price discovery.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results for our additional SPI measures. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 show 
that the coefficients of Gamma (both versions) are significantly positive.  In Models 3 and 6, the 
estimated coefficients on the Adjusted PIN (APIN) are significantly positive as well.  
Though we do not tabulate the results, we perform additional robustness checks. First, we split our 
sample period. We find that our results hold similarly for both halves of our sample period. Second, we 
calculate TFP at the two-digit SIC industry level so that we allow production functions to differ across 
industries. Our conclusions are the same.  
 
5.2. Endogeneity tests 
In Section 5.1, we reported the results from OLS regressions using different measures of SPI, 
different sample periods, and different control variables. All the estimates of the coefficients on the 
measures of SPI are significantly positive. In all the regressions, we use lagged values of the right-hand 
side variables to mitigate reverse causation concerns and use firm fixed effects to account for time-
invariant unobserved firm-specific variables. In this section, we further address endogeneity concerns 
through analyses using brokerage house research department closures, S&P 500 index additions, and 
mutual fund redemptions as plausibly exogenous events. 
 
5.2.1. Brokerage research department closures  
We first use brokerage house research department closures as exogenous shocks to the information 
production of the covered stocks (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013). These 
research departments produce information that they make available to their clients, including both 
institutional and retail clients. When research departments are closed, less information on the firms they 
cover is available to institutional and retail investors. We therefore expect the SPI for the stocks of these 
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firms to fall. The closure of a brokerage house research department has little or nothing to do with the 
fundamentals of the covered firms. Therefore, these shocks to the firms’ stocks are largely exogenous. 
 
5.2.1.a. Stock price informativeness and brokerage research department closures 
We first show evidence that brokerage research department closures affect stock price 
informativeness. To identify closures of brokerage houses, we start from the closures listed in Kelly 
and Ljungqvist (2012). We match the closure dates with the “delisting” (last) date of brokerage houses 
and the number of firms they cover in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).  Of the 22 
closures listed, we use Bloomberg and Factiva to manually identify 17 closures using the last date a 
brokerage appears in IBES and the number of firms it covers. We define a dummy variable Closure that 
equals one if a stock is covered by a closed research department in the previous one or two years before 
closure and zero otherwise. We then regress PIN and PSI on Closure and relevant control variables. 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in the tests. The results are reported in Table 3.  
Model 1 (2) of Table 3 shows the effect of brokerage closures on PIN (PSI). The coefficients of 
Closure in both models are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. These results confirm 
that stock price informativeness is reduced significantly by brokerage closures. The evidence supports 
the hypothesis that brokerage research department closures can be used as exogenous reductions in 
stock price informativeness. 
 
5.2.1.b. Event study: DiD analysis based on brokerage research department closures 
      To study the effect of price informativeness on TFP, we carry out a DiD analysis based on the 
brokerage research department closures. Specifically, we construct a propensity score matched (PSM) 
sample, in which the treated firms are those that experience brokerage closures and control firms are 
those that do not. We first restrict the potential control firms to those i) that have at least one analyst 
covering the firm, ii) are not covered by any of the 17 brokerage houses that ultimately close, and iii) 
have Compustat data available during the sample period. We then match treated firms to control firms 
using the Mahalanobis distance. We only consider matches in the same two-digit SIC code and then 
find the closest firm in terms of the total assets and Tobin’s q. 
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We first show a graphical analysis of the relation between TFP and brokerage closures following 
an approach used in the literature (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab, 2006; Acharya, Baghai, and 
Subramanian, 2014; Serfling, 2016). Specifically, we regress TFP on dummy variables indicating the 
year relative to the closure year and control for year fixed effects and firm size. The coefficients for the 
dummy variables are shown in Fig. 1. The dashed lines are for the 90% confidence intervals of the 
coefficient estimates, and the confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The figure shows that productivity (TFP) is not statistically different between treated and control 
firms three years before the event year. This shows that the parallel trend condition for the DiD analysis 
is satisfied. Furthermore, in the years after the closures, the TFP of the treated firms is significantly 
lower than that of control firms.  
We then estimate regressions for the DiD analysis. The first closure event is in 2000 and the last is 
in 2007. For each closure event, we define an event window from four years before to four years after 
the closure event.6 It leads to a test sample from 1996 to 2011. Specifically, we define a dummy variable, 
Treatment_post, which equals one if a firm experienced a brokerage closure over the previous four 
years and zero otherwise. The DiD specification is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                          (7) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient 
vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We 
drop the year of the closure in the regression analysis. The estimates are reported in Table 4.  
Model 1 shows that the coefficient of Treatment_post is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level. It indicates that negative shocks to SPI have a negative impact on the treated firms’ 
productivity. Specifically, compared to the control firms, the treated firms experience a 4.3% TFP 
decrease in standard deviation units. This result supports the causal interpretation of the estimates of 
the coefficients of SPI in regressions of TFP on SPI.   
To study how the effects of price informativeness on TFP evolve across years after the closure, we 
further define one dummy variable for each year after the closure event, and accordingly, we have four 
                                                          
6 Our results are robust to a different event window three years before to three years after a brokerage closure. 
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dummy variables. We replace the treatment variable Treatment_post in the previous test by these 
individual dummy variables and use the following specification: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ⋅ 𝐼𝑘
4
𝑘=1
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                                   (8) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, I𝑘 is a dummy variable that equals one when it is k year(s) 
after a brokerage closure and zero otherwise, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient 
vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The estimates are reported in Model 2 of Table 4.  
Model 2 shows that the coefficients β1  to β4  are all significantly negative, consistent with the 
results of Model 1. When time moves on, these coefficients become smaller (about 5% for the first two 
years and 4% for the last two years), and the significance level goes from the 1% level to the 10% level. 
We would expect that, over time, other analysts might start covering the firm and investors might start 
collecting more information about the stock. These developments should attenuate the effect of 
brokerage closures. The estimates in Model 2 also support the interpretation that the post-event decrease 
in TFP of treated firms is caused by the brokerage house closures that serve as negative exogenous 
shocks to SPI. 
 
5.2.2. S&P 500 index additions 
The firms in the S&P 500 index are selected by a committee based on eight primary criteria.7 The 
selected firms have little control on the selection process, so research examining the impact of additions 
to the S&P 500 index typically treats the event as exogenous (see, for instance, Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Shleifer, 1986).8 Existing research shows that prices of S&P 500 stocks are more likely to comove with 
the index (Vijh, 1994; Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005). Greater comovement implies that less 
firm-specific information is incorporated in the stock prices of firms in the index. As a result, if a firm 
                                                          
7 The primary criteria include specific requirements on the following eight dimensions: market capitalization, 
liquidity, domicile, public float, sector classification, financial viability, length of time publicly traded, and stock 
exchange. More details can be found at http://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-
indices.pdf.  
8 An exception is Denis et al. (2003).  
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is added to the index, its stock price informativeness falls. Accordingly, we expect that being added to 
the index reduces a firm’s productivity.  
 
5.2.2.a. Stock price informativeness and S&P 500 additions 
We first show evidence that S&P 500 additions have a negative effect on stock price 
informativeness. We define a dummy variable Addition that equals one if a firm is added to the S&P 
500 index in the previous one or two years and zero otherwise. We then regress PIN and PSI on Addition 
and relevant control variables. Firm and year fixed effects are included in these tests. The test sample 
includes firms with above-median book assets because firms added to S&P 500 Index are unlikely to 
have assets below median assets. The results are reported in Table 5.  
Model 1 shows the effect of S&P additions on PIN and Model 2 shows the effect on PSI. The 
coefficients of Addition in both models are negative and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively. These results confirm that the stock price informativeness decreases significantly 
after a firm is added into the S&P 500 index. The evidence supports the idea that S&P 500 additions 
serve as exogenous decreases in stock price informativeness. 
 
5.2.2.b. Event study: DiD analysis based on S&P 500 additions 
      In this section, we carry out a DiD analysis based on the events of S&P 500 additions. Specifically, 
we construct a PSM sample, where the treated firms are those that are added to the S&P 500 index and 
the control firms are those that are not. We restrict the potential control firms to firms i) that are never 
added to the S&P 500 index at any time during the sample period and ii) have Compustat data available 
during the sample period. We then match treated firms to control firms using the Mahalanobis distance. 
We only consider matches in the same two-digit SIC code and then find the closest firm in terms of 
total assets and Tobin’s q. 
Similar to the DiD analysis based on brokerage house closures, we first show a graphical analysis 
of the relation between TFP and S&P 500 index additions. Specifically, we regress TFP on dummy 
variables indicating the year relative to the index addition year and control for year fixed effects and 
firm size. The coefficients for dummy variables are shown in Fig. 2, in which the vertical axis is for 
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these estimated coefficients and the horizontal axis is for the time relative to the index addition events. 
The dashed lines are for the 90% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates, and the confidence 
intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The figure shows that productivity 
(TFP) is not statistically different between treated and control firms three years before the event year. 
This shows that the parallel trend condition for the DiD analysis is satisfied. Furthermore, in the years 
after index additions, the TFP of the treated firms is significantly lower than that of control firms. 
We then estimate regressions for the DiD analysis. For each S&P 500 index addition, we define an 
event window from four years before to four years after the index addition.9 We define a treatment 
dummy, SP500_addition, which equals one if a firm was added to the S&P 500 index over the previous 
four years and zero otherwise. The DiD specification is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃500_𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                      (9) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient 
vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The estimates are reported in Table 6. Model 1 shows that a firm’s TFP is significantly reduced after it 
is added to the S&P 500 index.  
      There might be concerns that firms with better performance are more likely to be selected in the 
index and the decrease in TFP after additions could be normal mean reversion in firm performance. We 
address this potential concern by using additional matching criteria on firms’ performance before index 
additions, in which the additional criteria are the firm’s stock return or its lagged TFP. Specifically, for 
each firm added to the S&P 500 index, we select a neighbor firm in terms of total assets, Tobin’s q, and 
either the stock return over the previous 12 months or lagged TFP. The results are reported in Models 
2 and 3, respectively. The results show that firms’ productivity is reduced after index additions, which 
is consistent with the evidence in Model 1. 
      One might be concerned that, after a stock is added to the index, its liquidity increases. Further, the 
cost of equity of the firm could fall. However, there is no good reason to expect that an increase in stock 
liquidity and a decrease in the cost of equity cause a decrease in productivity. Therefore, these effects 
                                                          




are more likely to weaken the negative effects of the decrease in SPI on productivity than to strengthen 
it. We address these concerns in Models 4 and 5 by further controlling for stock liquidity, return, and 
institutional ownership. Our results are robust to these additional controls.10  
      To study how the effects of index additions on TFP evolve across years, we define an individual 
dummy variable for each year after a closure event, and accordingly, we have four dummy variables. 
The specification is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 ⋅ 𝐼𝑘
4
𝑘=1
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                                  (10) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, I𝑘 is a dummy variable that equals one when it is k year(s) 
after an index addition and zero otherwise, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector 
of the controls, 𝜇𝑖  is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡  is the error term. The 
estimates are reported in Model 6. The estimates show that all coefficients 𝛾1 to 𝛾4 are significantly 
negative. The effect in the first year after an index addition is relatively weaker and only statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficients 𝛾2 to 𝛾4 are larger and all statistically significant at the 
1% level. It follows that a firm’s productivity is significantly reduced after the index addition, and the 
negative effects are persistent.  
 
5.2.3. Mutual fund redemption shock 
We further use mutual fund flow redemption pressure as an exogenous shock to price 
informativeness and show how a decrease in price informativeness reduces productivity. The literature 
shows that mutual fund redemptions bring downward pressure on the price of the stocks they hold and 
this effect is unrelated to firm fundamentals (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2012; Dessaint et al., 2019). These fund flow events fit well with the intuition that the affected stock 
                                                          
10 When combining the findings in Tables 2 and 5, one might be tempted to conclude that the effect of S&P 
additions on TFP (through PSI) is −0.154 × 0.02 ≈ −0.003. In contrast, when using a DiD analysis, the reduced-
form estimate of this relation in Table 6 (Column 5) is −0.058, which is larger.  The DiD analysis estimates the 
treatment effect of being added to the S&P by comparing firms added to the S&P 500 to similar firms. In contrast, 
the regressions in Table 2 estimate average effects for the two samples. Consequently, the coefficients are not 
comparable. However, it is also worth noting that a 95% confidence interval for the coefficient -0.058 in Table 6 




prices become less informative because lower stock prices after such a shock are less likely to signal 
that firm fundamentals have worsened.  
To be more specific, mutual fund flow pressure can have negative effects on stock price 
informativeness for the following two reasons. First, mutual funds with outflow pressure reduce their 
stock holdings for liquidity reasons. These liquidity-driven trades increase the fraction of uninformed 
trades in the market. Accordingly, the fraction of informed trades becomes relatively smaller, and as a 
result, stock prices become less informative (Easley et al., 1996; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002). 
Second, mutual fund pressure drives stock prices away from their fundamental value, which decreases 
investors’ incentives to collect private information on firm fundamentals for trading purposes: 
collecting private information is costly, but less valuable, because stock price variation is more 
influenced by factors unrelated to fundamentals.  
To measure a stock’s mutual fund flow pressure, we follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) 
and use the stock’s hypothetical sales by mutual funds that hold this stock and experience large fund 
outflows (at least 5% of a fund’s total assets). In contrast to actual sales, hypothetical sales alleviate 
endogeneity concerns because actual sales of mutual funds are likely influenced by managers’ views 
about firm fundamentals. We define a mutual fund flow pressure indicator variable MFFlow, which 
equals one if a stock’s hypothetical mutual fund sales are positive in a year and zero otherwise. A stock 
with mutual fund flow pressure is expected to experience a decrease in informativeness due to a drop 
in stock price unrelated with firm fundamentals. 
The negative relation between mutual fund flow pressure and stock price informativeness is 
confirmed by the data. We regress SPI measures on MFFlow and control variables using the following 
specification:  
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,                                 (11) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, SPI is PIN or PSI, MFFlow is the mutual fund flow pressure 
indicator, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm 
fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Results are reported in Table 7. The 
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coefficients on PIN and PSI are both negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results 
confirm that the mutual fund flow pressure significantly reduces stock price informativeness. 
      We then show the direct evidence that the mutual fund flow pressure has a negative effect on firms’ 
productivity. Our specification is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝛤 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,                                        (12) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, MFFlow is the mutual fund flow pressure indicator as 
defined above, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the 
firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Results are reported in Table 8. 
Models 1 and 2 show that the coefficients of MFFlow, 𝛽1, is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level.11 These results show that an exogenous decrease in price informativeness due to mutual fund 
flow pressure significantly reduces firms’ productivity. 
In this section, the analyses based on brokerage house closures, S&P 500 index additions, and 
mutual fund flow pressure all provide strong and consistent support for the causal effect of SPI on TFP. 
These results are consistent with the view that financial markets have real effects on the economy 
through their informational role. 
 
6. How does price informativeness affect TFP?  
In this section, we provide evidence on channels through which stock price informativeness affects 
TFP. Specifically, we use mutual fund flow redemption pressure and brokerage house closures as 
exogenous shocks to price informativeness and show that CEO turnover is less sensitive to Tobin’s q 
when price becomes less informative. We then investigate how price informativeness affects firms’ 
inputs and outputs, which are determinants of productivity. 
 
6.1. Price informativeness, CEO turnover, and productivity 
                                                          
11 In an unreported test, we further control for the stock return to address the concern that the decrease in TFP is 
only driven by the decrease in the stock price, and our result is robust. 
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In this paper, we investigate whether firms learn from stock price changes in such a way that what 
they learn helps them become more productive. If a firm’s stock price is more informative, firms learn 
more from stock price changes. When a firm’s stock price is less informative, management and investors 
put less weight on changes in stock prices when they assess firm performance and when they infer how 
the market values actions taken by management. Another way to put this is that the noisier the stock 
price, the less weight management puts on the stock price in its decision-making. As we explained in 
the previous section, a key issue in assessing whether SPI impacts TFP is that both SPI and TFP may 
be jointly affected by common factors, so a relation between SPI and TFP reflects the impact of changes 
of common factors rather than the impact of a change in SPI on TFP. We showed that the relation 
between SPI and TFP can be interpreted causally using three types of exogenous variation in SPI. These 
analyses did not, however, show how shocks to informativeness affect TFP.  
In this section, we provide evidence on this question. Specifically, we use mutual fund redemption 
pressure and brokerage firm closures as exogenous shocks to stock price informativeness.12 We show 
that the induced decrease in stock price informativeness causes a decrease in the responsiveness of CEO 
turnover to Tobin’s q. As CEO turnover falls because of the shock, productivity falls as well.  
 
6.1.1. Mutual fund flow pressure and CEO turnover 
It is well shown in the literature that boards use a firm’s stock price as a measure of CEO 
performance when making decisions on CEO turnover (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988; Coughlan 
and Schmidt, 1985; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001). However, when the stock price becomes less 
informative, we expect that boards optimally decrease the weight they put on the firm’s stock price 
when assessing CEO performance. For example, when a firm’s stock experiences large mutual fund 
flow pressure, the board would not want to attribute much of the drop in firm value to actions taken by 
                                                          
12 From the previous section, we know that S&P 500 index additions decrease stock price informativeness and 
productivity. This evidence suggests we should find the same impact on turnover-q sensitivity of such shocks that 
we find for brokerage closures and mutual fund redemption shocks. However, additions to the index are 
accompanied by an increase in institutional ownership, which may increase attention paid to the firm and to the 
performance of the CEO. This effect is a countervailing force, so the net impact of addition on the q sensitivity of 
turnover may be attenuated. It is therefore not surprising that we find the impact of S&P 500 index additions on 
the q sensitivity of turnover to be insignificant.  
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the CEO because it may be due, in part, or completely, to flow pressure unrelated to CEO performance. 
As the stock price becomes a poorer measure of CEO performance, we expect that CEO turnover 
becomes less likely and less sensitive to Tobin’s q. Importantly, if the CEO’s bad performance is 
disguised by the effect of mutual fund flow pressure on the stock price, failing to replace the CEO 
because of low stock price informativeness has a negative impact on the firm’s productivity. This 
illustrates one concrete channel through which stock price informativeness affects productivity. 
To test the effect of stock price informativeness on CEO turnover, we collect turnover data from 
the ExecuComp database during our sample period (1994 to 2015). The regression specification used 
in our tests is as follows:  
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                         (13) 
where i is the firm index, j is the industry index, and t is the year index, Turnover is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm has a CEO turnover in a year and zero otherwise, X is the vector of control 
variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑗 is the industry fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed 
effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
13 Our focus is on the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. We expect the sign of 𝛽1 
to be opposite of the sign of 𝛽2 , which indicates that mutual fund pressure weakens the turnover 
sensitivity to Tobin’s q. We estimate logit regressions and estimates are reported in Panel A of Table 9. 
 Model 1 shows that the coefficient of Tobin’s q is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It is consistent with the intuition that a lower market valuation makes CEO turnover more likely. 
More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction between q and MFFlow is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The opposite sign of the coefficient of q and the coefficient of the interaction 
term confirms that mutual fund flow pressure makes the turnover decisions less sensitive to the market 
valuation of the firm. Furthermore, the coefficient of MFFlow is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.14 This is consistent with the idea that flow pressure makes price less informative and hence 
reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to price. Model 2 further controls for firms’ return on assets 
                                                          
13 We use mutual fund flow pressure one year before the timing of Tobin’s q to alleviate the effect of flow pressure 
on q. Our results are robust when using flow pressure in the same year as q. 
14 This result is robust if we do not include the interaction between q and MFFlow. 
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(ROA) and includes a dummy variable Old CEO, which equals one if a CEO is older than 60 and zero 
otherwise. Our results are robust to these additional controls.  
 
6.1.2. Brokerage house closures and CEO turnover 
      We also use brokerage house closure as an exogenous shock to price informativeness and investigate 
its effect on CEO turnover sensitivity to q. Specifically, we use the same PSM sample and [-4, 4] event 
window as in Section 5.2.1. The specification of the logit model is the following: 
 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ 
                                                 +𝜇𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                   (14)  
where i is the firm index, j is the industry index, t is the year index, Turnover is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm has a CEO turnover in a year and zero otherwise, Closure_post is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm experienced a brokerage closure in the previous four years, X is the vector of 
control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑗 is the industry fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year 
fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Our focus is on the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. We expect that the sign 
of 𝛽1is opposite to that of 𝛽2 , which indicates that brokerage house closures weaken the turnover 
sensitivity to Tobin’s q. We estimate logit regressions, and estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 
9. 
      Consistent with the results in Panel A, the coefficient of Tobin’s q, 𝛽2 , is negative, and the 
coefficient of the interaction term, 𝛽1, is positive and statistically significant at the 10% or 5% level in 
Models 1 and 2, respectively. The sign of 𝛽1 is opposite to that of 𝛽2, which means that brokerage house 
closures reduce the turnover sensitivity to Tobin’s q. These results show that the decrease in price 
informativeness has a negative effect on the q sensitivity of turnover. 
 
6.1.3. CEO turnover and improvements of productivity 
Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 show that an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness makes CEO 
turnover less likely. We now provide further evidence on the link between SPI and productivity by 
28 
 
showing CEO turnover is followed by higher firm productivity. This means that when lower stock price 
informativeness prevents CEO changes that would otherwise happen, firm productivity can be 
negatively affected. We estimate the following regression:  
∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,            (15) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, ∆ is the first-difference operator, X is the vector of control 
variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, 
and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The estimates are reported in Table 10. 
Model 1 shows that CEO turnover two years ago is followed by a significant improvement in firm 
productivity (at the 5% level). The coefficient on last year’s turnover is also positive but not statistically 
significant. This shows that it takes a new CEO two years to improve firm productivity. Model 2 
includes the indicator variable for turnover three years ago to investigate whether the improvements of 
TFP reverse in later years. The result shows that firm productivity remains stable after the 
improvements. It means the improvement of productivity due to CEO turnover is not a temporary effect.  
Our findings show that stock price informativeness affects firms’ ability to learn from the stock 
price and to use it as a signal for efficiency improvement, such as whether to replace a CEO. When 
changes in price are less informative, firms have less information to make decisions and hence are less 
likely to take actions because they are less sure that these actions are optimal. These findings illustrate 
one concrete channel through which stock price informativeness affects firm productivity.  
 
6.2. Price informativeness, inputs, and outputs 
    SPI can affect TFP by increasing output for given inputs and by decreasing inputs for given 
output.  Consequently, to understand how SPI affects TFP, it is useful to assess separately how it affects 
inputs and output. The inputs that we consider include firms’ general operating expenses (SG&A, scaled 
by total assets) and labor costs. We use revenue as the measure of output. We expect that SPI increases 
output and decreases inputs, which in turn leads to a TFP improvement. Our specification is as follows. 
𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                                    (16) 
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where i is for firm i, t is for year t, IO stands for the measures of input and output, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 stands 
for PIN or PSI averaged over the previous three years, X is the vector of control variables, Γ is the 
coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is for the 
error term. The results are reported in Table 11.  
    Models 1 and 2 show that SPI increases output as measured by the logarithm of revenues. The 
coefficients of PIN and PSI are both positive and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that SPI 
has a positive effect on firm output. Models 3 and 4 show that SPI decreases general operating costs 
(SG&A, scaled by total assets). The coefficients of PIN and PSI are both negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% or the 5% level. These estimates are consistent with the idea that informative stock 
prices facilitate market monitoring and drive managers to allocate SG&A expenditures better to 
improve efficiency. Models 5 to 6 show that SPI decreases labor costs. The coefficients on both SPI 
measures are all significantly negative and indicate that firms with more informative stock prices spend 
less on wages. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in PIN (PSI) decreases wage payments 
by 3% (3%).  These real effects on the revenues, SG&A, and labor costs identify concrete channels 
through which SPI affects TFP. 
 
7. Cross-sectional heterogeneity 
    As explained in the introduction, we expect the ability and incentives of firms to take advantage of 
stock price informativeness to vary across firms. In this section, we first look at firm characteristics that 
affect a firm’s ability to extract information from its stock price. We then consider firms that are 
financially constrained. Finally, we consider how the relation between SPI and TFP is affected by 
product market competition and corporate governance.  
 
7.1. Firm characteristics 
    The effect of SPI on TFP should depend on firm characteristics. We consider four firm 
characteristics: firm size, firm age, complexity, and business risk. For each characteristic, we develop 
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predictions on how it affects the relation between SPI and TFP. Empirically, we test our hypotheses 
using the following specification: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐹𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,    (17) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 is the average of the previous three years of 
the measure of informativeness, and F stands for the firm characteristic we are investigating. X is the 
vector of control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is 
the year fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The results are reported in Table 12.  
    It is more difficult for larger firms to benefit from private information in stock prices. They are less 
able to adjust their organizational structure or production procedures. For example, a larger bureaucracy 
makes innovation more time-consuming, which in turn reduces the speed of productivity improvements 
(Holmstrom, 1989). We expect the TFP of large firms to be less sensitive to SPI, which corresponds to 
a negative 𝛽1in Eq. (17). The high asset dummy equals one if a firm’s total assets exceed the yearly 
median and zero otherwise. Models 1 and 2 of Table 12 show the estimates. Both 𝛽1s are negative and 
this coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% (10%) level for PIN (PSI). The results support our 
hypothesis that larger firms are less flexible and thus less able to take advantage of the information in 
their stock prices. However, it is important to note that the result that TFP increases with SPI holds for 
large firms so it is not a result driven by small firms. Specifically, if we exclude the bottom half of firms 
by either asset size or market value, we still find a relation between TFP and SPI (not tabulated). 
    Older firms are also at a disadvantage when it comes to using the private information in their stock 
prices. When firms become older, they are less able to adjust and take advantage of new growth 
opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2016). This lower flexibility makes it more difficult for 
older firms to benefit from the private information in their stock price. We expect the TFP of older firms 
to be less sensitive to SPI so that β1 should be negative. We measure a firm’s age by the number of 
years after its first appearance on CRSP (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; 
Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli, 2016). The results are reported in Table 12. Models 3 and 4 of Table 12 
show that the coefficients β1 for the interaction terms (both PIN and PSI) are negative and statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. They confirm that older firms benefit less from the private information in 
their stock prices.  
We expect the stock price to be less useful for more complex firms. We use firm-level 
diversification as an index of complexity. In stock markets, new information is incorporated into stock 
prices at the firm level, not at the business segment level. When a firm has more business segments, the 
information in its stock price is more difficult to interpret. When unique information on different 
business segments is aggregated, the information may not always be consistent or easy to interpret. 
Consequently, it is more challenging for managers to use the information in the firm’s stock price to 
improve the performance of different segments. We expect the TFP of more diversified firms to be less 
sensitive to SPI. We measure diversification by a diversification dummy, Diversified, which equals one 
if a firm has more than one business segment and zero otherwise.15 The results are reported in Table 12. 
In Models 5 and 6, the coefficient of the diversification dummy, β1, is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% (10%) level for PIN (PSI). This indicates that diversified firms’ productivity is 
less affected by their SPI, so diversification weakens the effect of SPI on TFP. This may be one reason 
why diversification hurts productivity. 
Firms with risky businesses tend to rely less on the internal information and more on outside signals. 
We measure business risk by the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the previous year. As 
such, we expect the TFP of a riskier firm to be more sensitive to its SPI. Models 7 and 8 confirm the 
amplification effect of business risk. Both 𝛽1s are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Riskier firms rely more on their SPI. 
 
7.2. Financial constraints 
Financially constrained firms have strong incentives to take steps to relax their constraints. 
Improving their resource allocation helps them in relaxing their constraints, as it improves their 
performance. At the same time, however, these firms are likely to be constrained in implementing 
                                                          




changes that require funding.16 Consequently, whether the productivity of financially constrained firms 
is more or less affected by SPI depends on whether making use of the information in the stock price 
requires the use of additional funds. As long as the information in the stock price can be used without 
additional funds, we expect the productivity of financially constrained firms to be more affected by SPI.   
We use four different financial constraint measures that are widely used in the literature. They are 
a no-dividend dummy (which equals one if the firm does not pay a dividend and zero otherwise), the 
Whited-Wu index, an indicator variable for whether the firm has a bond rating (which equals one if the 
firm has no bond rating and zero otherwise), and the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index. Our 
specification is as follows. 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                  (18) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 stands for PIN or PSI, which is the average of 
the previous three years accordingly, FC stands for the measure of financial constraints, X is the vector 
of control variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year 
fixed effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We expect the coefficient of the interaction terms to be positive, 
which indicates an amplification effect of financial constraints. The results are reported in Table 13.  
Table 13 estimates eight models for four measures of financial constraints. For each measure, we 
show results for PIN and PSI. The relevant interaction term, 𝛽1, has a significant positive coefficient in 
each model except for Model 7. Among the eight models, the coefficients are statistically significant in 
seven models and insignificant at the 10% level in only one model. These results provide some evidence 
that financially constrained firms benefit more from the informativeness of their stock price. 
 
7.3. Product market competition 
                                                          
16 Note that a higher SPI makes a firm more transparent to outside capital providers. Hence, a higher SPI could 




More competition in the product market gives firms a stronger motive to improve productivity so 
that they can survive or gain larger market share. We should therefore find that product market 
competition amplifies the effect of SPI on productivity.  
We use three text-based network industry classification (TNIC) competition measures: TNIC 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration, product similarity (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016), and 
product market fluidity (Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala, 2014). These measures are from the Hoberg 
and Phillips data library. In our analysis, we define three dummy variables for high competition based 
on these three measures: Low HHI, High similarity, and High fluidity. High similarity (fluidity) equals 
one if the product similarity (fluidity) is above the yearly median and zero otherwise. Low HHI equals 
one if the TNIC HHI is below the yearly median and zero otherwise. Our specification is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 
                    +𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                              (19) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 is the three-year average of the informativeness 
measure, Competition stands for the product market competition measure, X is the vector of control 
variables, Γ is the coefficient vector of the controls, 𝜇𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed effect, 
and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We expect the coefficient of the interaction term (𝛽1) to be positive, which 
indicates that firms in more competitive product markets are more likely to use their informative stock 
prices to improve productivity. The results are reported in Table 14.  
Models 1 and 2 provide estimates for the coefficients of Low HHI, which is a dummy for high 
competition. The coefficients 𝛽1 in the first two models are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Model 1 (2) shows that for high competition firms, the effect of PIN (PSI) is amplified by 
37% (43%) compared to the effect for low competition firms. Models 3 and 4 show estimates for the 
High similarity variable. The product market is more competitive if the products of the firms in the 
industry are close substitutes. High similarity is a dummy for high competition. The estimates of 𝛽1 in 
these models are positive and statistically significant at the 5% or the 10% level. Lastly, Models 5 and 
6 show estimates for the High fluidity variable. Fluidity measures the extent to which rivals present 
competitive threats to the firm. The coefficients 𝛽1  for PIN and PSI are both positive but only 
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statistically significant at the 10% level for PSI in Model 6. These results are consistent with the results 
for the High similarity variable. All results in Table 14 are consistent with firms in more competitive 
product markets reacting to the information in their stock price more strongly, and accordingly, the SPI 
effect on TFP is amplified by product market competition.  
 
7.4. Corporate governance  
We would expect better governed firms to be more incentivized to make the most out of their 
resources. If a firm has weak governance, managers may shirk and ignore new information in the stock 
price. Therefore, we expect SPI to have more of an impact on TFP in firms with better governance.   
Our corporate governance measures include a high institutional ownership dummy (based on 
median in a year), the number of blockholders (logarithm), and the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003). Our regression model is as follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                 (20) 
where i is the firm index, t is the year index, 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−3,𝑡−1  stands for the three-year average of the 
informativeness measure, Gov stands for the corporate governance measure, X is the vector of control 
variables, Γ is the coefficient vector for the controls, 𝜇𝑖  is the firm fixed effect, 𝜗𝑡 is the year fixed 
effect, and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We expect the coefficient of the interaction terms (𝛽1) to be negative 
for the SPI interaction with the G-index (weak governance), and positive for the SPI interaction with 
the remaining two measures. The results are reported in Table 15.  
Models 1 and 2 show estimates for institutional ownership. It is common in the literature to view 
higher institutional ownership as indicating more monitoring from institutional investors and better 
external governance. We measure the strength of this governance by the High institutional ownership 
dummy, which equals one if institutional ownership is above the median in a year and zero otherwise. 
The coefficients of the interaction term in Models 1 and 2 are both positive and statistically significant 




Models 3 and 4 show estimates for the number of blockholders (logarithm). A blockholder is a 
shareholder holding at least 5% of a firm’s outstanding shares. Blockholders have strong incentives to 
monitor firms because they are less likely to be free riders than some shareholders with smaller holdings. 
More blockholders suggests stronger governance. The coefficient of the interaction between the number 
of blockholders and the informativeness measure is positive in both models, which confirms that firms 
with stronger governance have a stronger TFP-SPI sensitivity. 
Our last governance measure is the G-index. A high value of the G-index indicates more 
entrenchment of managers and weaker governance. Models 5 and 6 show the results for the G-index.  
The coefficient of the interaction between the G-index and PIN,  𝛽1 , is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the interaction for PSI is also negative but not statistically 
different from zero. The evidence from all three measures of corporate governance consistently shows 
that TFP for firms with better governance is more sensitive to SPI.   
 
8. Alternative efficiency measures 
We now show that the relation between TFP and SPI holds for other efficiency measures. Following 
Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2016), we use the following five efficiency measures: sales/book-value-
of-assets ratio, sales/value-of-assets-in-place (VAIP) ratio, cost of goods sold (COGS) per employee, 
ROA, and the loss dummy for negative net income. We also include a TFP growth measure originally 
proposed by Chun, Kim, and Morck (2011).17 The results for these tests are shown in Table 16. 
Models 1 and 2 provide estimates using the sales/book-value-of-assets ratio as a dependent variable. 
The results show that PIN (PSI) has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
(1%) level. Models 3 and 4 show results with sales/value-of-assets-in-place ratio as the dependent 
variable. The results are consistent with those of Models 1 and 2. The results for the ratio of COGS per 
employee are shown in Models 5 and 6. The coefficient of PSI is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient of PIN is not significant at the conventional level. This is the only 
insignificant coefficient out of the ten in this table. Models 7 and 8 show results for ROA. Both PIN 
                                                          
17 The calculation of the TFP Growth measure is in Appendix C. 
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and PSI have positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. Models 9 and 10 report results 
for the loss dummy. Both PIN and PSI have negative coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. 
Lastly, Models 11 and 12 show the results for the effects of SPI on TFP Growth. Both PIN and PSI 
have positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level. The evidence for these 
alternative efficiency measures corroborates our earlier findings that SPI improves firms’ efficiency. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Our paper provides evidence that an increase in the informativeness of a firm’s stock price causes 
an increase in the firm’s productivity. We address endogeneity concerns using multiple methods. Our 
baseline specification includes firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved firm-specific 
variables and uses lagged measures of informativeness. More importantly, we explore DiD analyses 
based on exogenous shocks to stock price informativeness. These efforts provide strong evidence in 
support of the causal effect of stock price informativeness on TFP. Using mutual fund flow pressure 
and brokerage firm closures as exogenous shocks to price informativeness, we further illustrate a 
concrete channel through which stock price informativeness affects firm productivity. Specifically, we 
show that firms’ CEO turnover decisions are less sensitive to Tobin’s q after firms experience fund flow 
pressure or a brokerage firm closure and a reduction in CEO turnover has an adverse impact on firm 
productivity. An increase in stock price informativeness could affect productivity through other 
channels than the one we use as an illustration, but we leave the investigation of additional channels to 
future work. For example, economic competitiveness could increase price informativeness (Irvine and 
Pontiff, 2009) and drive firms to increase innovation, which is typically considered a missing factor of 
production. 
We further investigate predictions about how the impact of SPI on TFP varies along different firm 
characteristics. We predict and confirm that firm size, firm age, and firm complexity affect adversely 
the ability of the firm to exploit information in its stock price. We also find that financial constraints, 




Our results have implications for the role of the stock market and the benefits of being a listed 
company. With our results, the price discovery function of the stock market plays an important role in 
how firms operate and how efficient they are. The role of the stock market is not just to provide funds 
to firms but to also guide their decisions. As a result, firms that benefit from that price discovery because 
their common stock is listed on an exchange  can and do use it to make better decisions that makes them 
more productive.   
Our analyses focus on US public firms, but our findings may have implications on cross-country 
differences in living standards. Solow (1956) links higher living standards to higher productivity 
growth. Our results imply that higher stock price informativeness in a country can be a contributing 
factor to the economic success of that country (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2013). As Morck, Yeung, and 
Yu (2000) show, cross-country variation in stock price informativeness can be partly explained by 
differences in the quality of institutions. Our results suggest that one reason better institutions lead 
countries to be more economically successful is that their higher stock price informativeness causes 
their firms to be more productive.  
Appendix A. Variable definitions  
 
Bond rating  a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has debt 
outstanding but does not have S&P long-term senior debt 
rating in or before that year or has default debt rating in 
that year and zero otherwise 
 
Business risk  the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns 
over the previous year 
 
Cash/Assets  cash and cash equivalent (CHE) scaled by total assets 
 
Cash flow  the operating cash flow less investing cash flow and 
dividends scaled by total assets 
 
COGS/Employees the cost of goods sold (COGS) scaled by employees, as 
calculated in Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2016) 
 
Debt/Assets  the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by total 
assets 
 
Diversified a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has multiple 




Dividend dummy a dummy variable equal to one if a firm pay a dividend 
and zero otherwise 
 
Firm age the number of years since a firm appeared in the CRSP 
database 
 
G-index the governance measure following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) 
 
Gamma the average of the previous three years of the Gamma, 
where Gamma(Market) is from Frésard (2012) and 
Gamma(No market) is from Llorente et al. (2002) 
 
High assets  a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has above yearly 
median total assets and zero otherwise 
 
High fluidity a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has above yearly 
median fluidity (a measure of product market 
competition), as defined in Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2014), and zero otherwise 
 
High similarity a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has above yearly 
median similarity (a measure of product market 
competition), as defined in Hoberg and Phillips (2016), 
and zero otherwise 
 
High institutional ownership a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s institutional 
ownership is above the median in a year and zero 
otherwise. 
 
IQS                                             investment-q sensitivity: regress capital expenditures 
(scaled by total assets) on lagged Tobin’s q, logarithm of 
total assets, and cash flows in a 5-year rolling window. 
IQS is the coefficient of Tobin’s q 
 
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index   the financial constraint index constructed following 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
 
Log(Assets)     the natural logarithm of total book value of assets 
 
Log(N_blockholders) the natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s large 
shareholders (>5%)  
 
Log(Cashflow) the natural logarithm of cash flow 
 
Log(Employees)           the natural logarithm of the number of employees 
 





Log(Wages)    the natural logarithm of staff expenses 
 
Loss a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s net income is 
negative 
 
Low HHI a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has below yearly 
median firm-level Herfindahl/concentration measure, as 
calculated in Hoberg and Phillips (2016), and zero 
otherwise 
 
MFFlow a dummy variable that equals one if a stock’s 
hypothetical fund sales is positive and zero otherwise, 
where the hypothetical fund sales follow that in Edmans, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) 
No-dividend dummy a dummy variable equal to one if a firm does not pay a 
dividend and zero otherwise 
 
Old CEO a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO is older than 60 
 
PIN  the average of the previous three years of PIN 
(probability of information-based trading) following 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) 
 
PP&E/Assets  the value of plant, property, and equipment (PP&E) 
scaled by total assets 
 
PSI  the average of the previous three years of PSI (Stock 
Price Nonsynchronicity) following Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) 
 
R&D/Assets  research & development (R&D) expenditures scaled by 
total assets, which is set to zero if missing 
 
Return volatility the standard deviation of the previous year’s daily stock 
returns 
 
ROA return on assets – the ratio of the firm’s operating 
income before depreciation divided by the lagged book 
value of total assets 
 
ROE return on equity – the ratio of the firm’s net income 
scaled by shareholder (book value) equity  
 
 
ROE volatility the standard deviation of ROE over the previous five 
years 
 
Sales/BV a firm's sales scaled by book value as calculated in 




Sales/VAIP  a firm's sales scaled by the value of assets in place (VAIP) 
as calculated in Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2016) 
 
SG&A the natural logarithm of selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) costs scaled by total assets 
 
Turnover a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has CEO 
turnover in a year and zero otherwise 
 
TFP  total factor productivity calculated following Ackerberg, 
Caves, and Frazer (2015) 
 
Tobin’s q  the sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus 
book value of equity divided by total assets 
 
Whited-Wu index  the financial constraint index constructed following 





Appendix B. TFP estimation 
Our main measure of productivity is the TFP, which is the portion of output not explained by the 
amount of inputs used in production. TFP increases as a firm uses its inputs more efficiently. Consider 
the Cobb-Douglas product function 
𝑌 = 𝐴 ⋅ 𝐾𝛼 ⋅ 𝐿𝛽 ,                                                                      (𝐴1) 
where Y is the output, K is capital, L is labor, and A is productivity. 
    Taking the natural logarithm on both sides, we have 
ln(𝑌) = 𝛼 ⋅ ln(𝐾) + 𝛽 ⋅ ln(𝐿) + ln(𝐴).                                                        (𝐴2) 
    To calculate ln (𝐴), the measure of TFP, we estimate the following specification 
ln(𝑌) = 𝛽0 + 𝛼 ⋅ ln(𝐾) + 𝛽 ⋅ ln(𝐿) + ,                                                       (𝐴3) 
where 𝛽0 is the intercept and  is the error term (residuals after the estimation). If we rearrange the 
terms on the right-hand side, we have 
ln(𝑌) = 𝛼 ⋅ ln(𝐾) + 𝛽 ⋅ ln(𝐿) +𝛽0 + .                                                       (𝐴4) 
   Comparing Eq. (A2) and Eq. (A4), TFP can be measured as 
ln(𝐴) = 𝛽0 +                                                                              (𝐴5) 
so that TFP is the sum of the intercept and the residual in Eq. (A3), which is the part of output 
unexplained by inputs (capital K and labor L).     
    Rewriting Eq. (A3) and using lower letters for the log of variables in capital letters, we have 
yi,t = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ϵit,                                                     (𝐴6) 
where yi,t is the log of the value added of the firm, kit is the log value of capital, lit is the log value of 
labor, and ϵit is the error term. Using hats to denote estimates, our TFP measure is calculated as yi,t −
β̂kkit − β̂llit. 
To calculate TFP, we first need to estimate the production function Eq., i.e. the coefficients in Eq. 
(A6). Due to the endogeneity issue mentioned above, the OLS estimator is biased (Olley and Pakes, 
1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). We estimate the production function following the method by 
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Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). In our robustness tests, we try an alternative firm-level TFP 
measure, which is calculated by Imrohoroğlu, and Tüzel (2014) and is based on the methodology in 
Olley and Pakes (1996). Our results are robust to the alternative TFP measure. 
To calculate firm-level TFP, we use firm data from Compustat. Besides the data from Compustat, 
we use the following additional data for the production function estimation: i) the price index for gross 
domestic product (GDP) as a deflator for the value added and ii) the price index for private fixed 
investment as a deflator for investment and capital (both from the BEA). 
Value added is sales minus materials, deflated by the GDP deflator. Sales are revenue (revt) from 
Compustat. Materials is total expenses minus labor expenses. Total expenses is revenue less operating 
income before depreciation and amortization (oibdp). Labor expenses is the wage (xlr) variable in 
Compustat. When xlr is missing, we first calculate the average wage per employee within an industry 
(Fama-French 12) using the nonmissing wages in that industry, and then we calculate a firm’s labor 
cost using the number of employees in the firm times the industry average wage per employee. Capital 
(K) is measured as gross plant, property, and equipment (ppegt) deflated by the price deflator for 
investment and then adjusted to take into account the average age of the capital stock (Hall, 1990; 




Appendix C. TFP growth estimation 
    We calculate a measure of firm-level TFP growth following the definition in Chun, Kim, and 
Morck (2011, 2016). Specifically, the TFP growth is defined as  
Δln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡) = Δln (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) −
1
2
[𝑆𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐿,𝑖,𝑡−1]Δln (𝐿𝑖,𝑡) −
1
2
[𝑆𝐾,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐾,𝑖,𝑡−1]Δln (𝐾𝑖,𝑡), 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝐾𝑖,𝑡  are firm i’s value-added, labor, and capital, respectively. Δ  is the first-
difference operator, and ln(⋅) is the natural logarithm. 𝑆𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐾,𝑖,𝑡 are the shares of the firm’s labor 
costs and capital costs.  
   Value-added 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the operating income before depreciation (oibdp) plus labor. Labor is the wage 
expenses (xlr). When the wage expenses are missing, labor is calculated as the number of employees 
(emp) times the average wage per employee in the industry (SIC2), in which the wage per employee is 
calculated as xlr divided by emp for each firm in the industry. Capital is defined as gross plant, property, 
and equipment (ppegt). We account for inflation following the method of İmrohoroğlu and Tüzel (2014) 
and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003). Firm i’s labor cost share, 𝑆𝐿,𝑖,𝑡, is its labor cost divided by the sum of 
its labor and capital costs. Firm i’s capital cost share, 𝑆𝐾,𝑖,𝑡, is one minus its labor cost share. We follow 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) method in smoothing 𝑆𝐿,𝑖,𝑡and 𝑆𝐾,𝑖,𝑡 by averaging each across the 
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Fig. 1. Graphical analysis of the effect of brokerage closures on TFP 
This figure shows the graphical analysis for the effect of brokerage closures on TFP. The y-axis plots the 
coefficient estimates from regressing TFP on dummy variables indicating the year relative to a brokerage closure, 
controlling for year fixed effects and firm size. The x-axis shows the time relative to the brokerage closure. The 
dashed lines correspond to 90% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates, and the confidence intervals are 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample includes firms that experienced brokerage closures 
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Fig. 2. Graphical analysis of the effect of S&P 500 index additions on TFP 
This figure shows the graphical analysis for the effect of S&P 500 index additions on TFP. The y-axis plots the 
coefficient estimates from regressing TFP on dummy variables indicating the year relative to an index addition, 
controlling for year fixed effects and firm size. The x-axis shows the time relative to the index addition. The 
dashed lines correspond to 90% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates, and the confidence intervals are 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample includes firms that were added to the S&P 500 






























This table presents summary statistics for TFP, stock price informativeness measures PIN and PSI, and firm 
characteristics. The sample consists of firms in Compustat for which TFP and the stock price informativeness 
measures are available for the years 1994–2015, inclusive.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
Variable Mean p25 p50 p75 SD N 
TFP 0.03 –0.33 0.00 0.37 0.60 66,341 
PIN 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.11 66,341 
PSI 2.22 0.90 2.06 3.44 1.71 63,504 
Log(Assets) 6.55 5.08 6.43 7.88 2.00 66,341 
Cash/Assets 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.17 66,341 
Debt/Assets 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.36 0.22 66,134 
R&D/Assets 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 66,341 
Tobin’s q 1.82 1.10 1.41 2.03 1.40 64,876 
PP&E/Assets 0.28 0.09 0.21 0.42 0.23 66,341 
Business risk 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 55,492 
Log(N_blockholders) 1.06 0.68 1.10 1.39 0.55 25,511 
Diversified 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 66,341 
SG&A/Assets 0.25 0.07 0.19 0.35 0.25 66,341 


















Price informativeness and productivity 
This table presents panel regressions of total factor productivity (TFP) on stock price informativeness and other 
firm-level controls. In Panel A, stock price informativeness is measured by the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) and stock price nonsynchronicity (PSI). IQS is investment-q sensitivity. In Panel B, we test additional SPI 
measures. The first measure is Gamma, a trading-based informativeness measure calculated in Eq. (12) in Llorente 
et al. (2002). We calculate this measure in two ways. The first method (Columns 1 and 4) is as in Eq. (3) in Frésard 
(2012) and controls for both firm and market returns, while the second method (Columns 2 and 5) only controls 
for firm returns as in the original Llorente et al. (2002). The last additional stock price informativeness measure, 
Adjusted PIN (APIN), is calculated using Eq. (7) in Duarte and Young (2009). In our regressions, we use the 
average SPI over the previous three years. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. The sample 
consists of firms in Compustat for which TFP and the stock price informativeness measures are available for the 
years 1994–2015 except for Column 5 in Panel A, which is from 1962–2015. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Primary SPI measures (PIN & PSI) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP 
PIN 0.262***  0.256***   0.234***  
 [8.80]  [8.63]   [7.82]  
PSI  0.018***  0.019*** 0.010***  0.020*** 
  [5.92]  [6.31] [3.82]  [6.50] 
Log(Assets) 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.225*** 0.228*** 0.170*** 0.221*** 0.225*** 
 [35.75] [34.41] [33.39] [32.15] [30.02] [31.49] [30.50] 
Tobin’s q 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.136*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
 [19.63] [19.34] [19.30] [19.03] [43.68] [17.11] [16.83] 
Cash/Assets   0.042 0.043 -0.049* 0.067** 0.070** 
   [1.54] [1.52] [-1.85] [2.30] [2.33] 
Debt/Assets   –0.226*** –0.233*** –0.278*** –0.214*** –0.220*** 
   [–10.80] [–10.88] [–14.83] [–9.91] [–9.95] 
R&D/Assets   –1.139*** –1.137*** –1.943*** –1.153*** –1.145*** 
   [–9.78] [–9.72] [–15.84] [–9.13] [–9.04] 
Capex/Assets   
   
0.658*** 0.670*** 
   
   
[9.90] [10.05] 
IQS   
   –0.008* –0.009** 
   
   [–1.90] [–2.18] 
Capex/Assets * IQS   
   
0.060 0.074* 
   
   
[1.43] [1.74] 
        
Observations 61,554 58,889 61,363 58,700 108,832 60,121 57,497 
R-squared 0.178 0.176 0.192 0.191 0.172 0.172 0.172 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Panel B: Additional SPI measures (Gamma and APIN) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP 
              
Gamma (Market) 0.035***   0.031**   
 [2.65]   [2.35]   
Gamma (No market)  0.028**   0.024**  
  [2.32]   [2.05]  
APIN   0.177***   0.175*** 
   [5.55]   [5.55] 
Log(Assets) 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.244*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.234*** 
 [33.23] [33.22] [34.55] [31.50] [31.50] [32.21] 
Tobin’s q 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 
 [18.32] [18.32] [18.15] [18.08] [18.09] [17.84] 
Cash/Assets    0.026 0.026 0.039 
    [0.90] [0.90] [1.34] 
Debt/Assets    –0.256*** –0.256*** –0.259*** 
    [–11.68] [–11.69] [–11.14] 
R&D/Assets    –1.161*** –1.161*** –1.171*** 
    [–9.39] [–9.39] [–9.23] 
       
Observations 54,485 54,485 48,924 54,310 54,310 48,760 
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.179 0.190 0.190 0.195 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
















The effect of brokerage house closures on stock price informativeness 
This table shows the effect of brokerage closures on stock price informativeness. The specification is as follows: 
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 . SPI is PIN or PSI. Closure is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a stock is covered by a closed research department in the previous one or two years and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are the same as used in Column 3 of Table 2. The sample consists of firms in 
Compustat for which the stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 1994–2015. Firm and 
year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables PIN PSI 
   
Closure –0.013** –0.101** 
 [–2.48] [–1.97] 
Log(Assets) –0.032*** –0.469*** 
 [–22.06] [–25.04] 
Tobin's q –0.005*** –0.278*** 
 [–5.74] [–34.37] 
Cash/Assets –0.008 –0.190** 
 [–1.20] [–2.51] 
Debt/Assets 0.035*** 0.784*** 
 [6.48] [10.90] 
R&D/Assets –0.001 0.426* 
 [–0.04] [1.71] 
   
Observations 44,359 42,257 
R-squared 0.484 0.765 
Firm FE Y Y 






DiD analysis: brokerage house closures and productivity 
This table shows DiD tests based on the closures of brokerage house research departments. The sample is from 
1996 to 2011. A firm is defined as a treated firm if its stock is covered by a closed research department. For each 
closure event, we define an event window as four years before to four years after the closure. For each treated 
firm, we use propensity score match to choose a control firm in the same industry (two-digit SIC) and matched 
by total assets and Tobin’s q using Mahalanobis distance. In Model 1 the treatment dummy Treatment_post equals 
one if a stock is covered by a closed research department and the year is between one and four years after the 
closure year and zero otherwise. In Model 2 we define four treatment dummy variables, one dummy for each year 
during the four years after a closure. Closure years are dropped in the regressions. All specifications include firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are 
in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables TFP TFP 
    
Treatment_post –0.043**  
 [–2.29]  
One year after closure  –0.051*** 
  [–2.75] 
Two years after closure  –0.049** 
  [–2.45] 
Three years after closure  –0.040* 
  [–1.80] 
Four years after closure  –0.043* 
  [–1.94] 
Log(Assets) 0.248*** 0.249*** 
 [12.88] [12.98] 
Tobin’s q 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 [3.85] [3.85] 
Cash/Assets 0.173** 0.173** 
 [2.27] [2.27] 
Debt/Assets –0.248*** –0.246*** 
 [–4.76] [–4.71] 
R&D/Assets –1.364*** –1.361*** 
 [–3.23] [–3.22] 
   
Observations 7,851 7,851 
R-squared 0.801 0.801 
Firm FE Y Y 







The effect of S&P 500 additions on stock price informativeness 
This table shows the effect of S&P 500 additions on the stock price informativeness. The specification is as 
follows: 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ Addition𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 . SPI is PIN or PSI. Addition is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is added to the S&P 500 index in the previous one or two years and zero otherwise. 
Control variables are the same as used in Column 3 of Table 2. Firm and year fixed effects are included. The 
sample includes firms with above yearly median book assets because firms added into S&P 500 index are unlikely 
to have assets below median assets. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables PIN PSI 
   
Addition –0.008* –0.154*** 
 [–1.66] [–3.31] 
Log(Assets) –0.019*** –0.297*** 
 [–9.80] [–10.45] 
Tobin's q –0.002** –0.106*** 
 [–2.17] [–5.21] 
Cash/Assets –0.011 –0.275** 
 [–1.28] [–2.53] 
Debt/Assets 0.041*** 0.848*** 
 [4.91] [6.93] 
R&D/Assets 0.001 0.220 
 [0.02] [0.47] 
   
Observations 21,830 20,913 
R-squared 0.356 0.726 
Firm FE Y Y 






DiD analysis: S&P 500 index additions and productivity 
This table shows DiD tests based on S&P 500 index additions. A firm is defined as a treated firm if it is added to 
the S&P 500 index in a year. For each index addition, we define an event window as four years before to four 
years after the index addition. For each treated firm, we use PSM to choose a control firm in the same industry 
(two-digit SIC) and matched by total assets and Tobin’s q with minimum Mahalanobis distance in Models 1, 4, 
5, and 6. We use additional match variable lagged stock return in Model 2 or lagged TFP in Model 3. In Models 
1 to 5 the treatment dummy, SP500_addition, equals one if a firm is added to the S&P 500 index over the previous 
four years and zero otherwise. In Model 6 we define four treatment dummy variables, one dummy for each year 
during the four years after a closure. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP 
        
SP500_addition –0.083*** –0.100*** –0.082*** –0.084*** –0.058**  
 [–3.81] [–4.78] [–4.00] [–3.77] [–2.16]  
One year after add      –0.036* 
      [–1.86] 
Two years after add      –0.105*** 
      [–3.87] 
Three years after add      –0.141*** 
      [–4.42] 
Four years after add      –0.146*** 
      [–4.44] 
Log(Assets) 0.167*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 0.183*** 
 [7.26] [8.31] [9.64] [7.22] [5.94] [7.43] 
Tobin’s q 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.066*** 
 [6.38] [5.11] [6.82] [6.01] [4.66] [6.18] 
Cash/Assets –0.025 0.080 0.138 –0.035 –0.085 –0.077 
 [–0.24] [0.71] [1.34] [–0.27] [–0.62] [–0.68] 
Debt/Assets –0.288*** –0.253*** –0.302*** –0.248*** –0.232** –0.243*** 
 [–3.57] [–2.97] [–4.85] [–3.15] [–2.56] [–2.83] 
R&D/Assets –1.207** –1.086** –0.980* –0.690 –0.433 –1.047** 
 [–2.28] [–2.26] [–1.92] [–1.30] [–1.00] [–2.01] 
Amihud    –0.098*** –1.453***  
    [–2.65] [–6.64]  
Stock return    0.017 –0.009  
    [1.03] [–0.59]  
Inst ownership     0.071  
     [0.73]  
       
Observations 3,908 3,855 3,887 3,202 2,141 3,482 
R-squared 0.193 0.210 0.230 0.176 0.178 0.191 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Mutual fund flow pressure and stock price informativeness 
This table presents the estimates of the specification 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. SPI 
is PIN or PSI. MFFlow is a dummy variable that equals one if a stock’s hypothetical fund sales is positive and 
zero otherwise. The hypothetical fund sales are constructed as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012). The sample 
consists of firms in Compustat for which the stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 
1994–2015. Firm fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables PIN PSI 
   
MFFlow –0.005*** –0.137*** 
 [–3.75] [–8.67] 
Log(Assets) –0.032*** –0.439*** 
 [–21.92] [–22.82] 
Tobin's q –0.005*** –0.136*** 
 [–5.72] [–7.13] 
Cash/Assets –0.007 –0.341*** 
 [–1.16] [–4.25] 
Debt/Assets 0.034*** 0.840*** 
 [6.37] [10.93] 
R&D/Assets –0.001 0.400 
 [–0.05] [1.53] 
   
Observations 44,359 42,257 
R-squared 0.484 0.760 
Firm FE Y Y 







Mutual fund redemption pressure and TFP 
This table shows the effect of mutual fund redemption on TFP. The specification is 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅
𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. MFFlow is a dummy variable that equals one if a stock’s hypothetical fund 
sales is positive and zero otherwise. The hypothetical fund sales follow that in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang 
(2012). The sample consists of firms in Compustat for which our TFP variable is available for the years 1994–
2015. Firm fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables TFP TFP 
      
MFFlow –0.012*** –0.013*** 
 [–2.93] [–3.15] 
Log(Assets) 0.217*** 0.209*** 
 [36.11] [33.92] 
Tobin's q 0.128*** 0.126*** 
 [42.33] [42.00] 
Debt/Assets  –0.207*** 
  [–10.95] 
Cash/Assets  0.018 
  [0.69] 
R&D/Assets  –1.196*** 
  [–10.85] 
   
Observations 67,572 67,364 
R-squared 0.791 0.794 
Firm FE Y Y 






Exogenous shocks to price informativness and CEO turnover 
This table illustrates how decreases in stock price informativeness affect CEO turnover sensitivity to q. Panel A 
(B) presents the estimates of the logit model, where mutual fund flow pressure (brokerage house closure) is the 
exogenous shock to price informativeness. Turnover is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm experiences a 
CEO turnover in the year and zero otherwise. In Panel A, MFFlow is a dummy variable that equals one if a stock’s 
hypothetical fund sales is positive and zero otherwise. The hypothetical fund sales are constructed as in Edmans, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012). The sample consists of firms in Execucomp for the years 1994–2015. In Panel B, 
Closure_post is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a brokerage closure in the previous four 
years and zero otherwise. In Panel B, we use the window [-4, 4] around brokerage closures and use a PSM sample 
as in Table 4 for which Execucomp data is available. Old CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO’s 
age is above 60 and zero otherwise. Industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included, where industry 
classification is the one-digit SIC. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are 
in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CEO turnover sensitivity to q and mutual fund flow pressure  
  (1) (2) 
Variables CEO turnover CEO turnover 
   
MFFlow × Tobin’s q 0.130*** 0.126*** 
 [2.80] [2.84] 
Tobin’s q –0.211*** –0.078** 
 [–5.40] [–2.01] 
MFFlow –0.353*** –0.347*** 
 [–3.68] [–3.74] 
Log(Assets) 0.086*** 0.082*** 
 [5.02] [4.69] 
Return volatility 8.545*** 3.253 
 [4.21] [1.43] 
ROA  –3.787*** 
  [–13.77] 
Debt/Assets  –0.368** 
  [–2.46] 
Old CEO  0.862*** 
  [19.20] 
   
Observations 21,148 20,691 
R-squared 0.0110 0.0461 
Industry FE Y Y 





Panel B: CEO turnover sensitivity to q and brokerage research department closures  
  (1) (2) 
Variables CEO turnover CEO turnover 
      
Tobin's q × Closure_post 0.255* 0.270** 
 [1.86] [1.98] 
Tobin’s q –0.236*** –0.168** 
 [–3.57] [–2.25] 
Closure_post –0.423 –0.432 
 [–1.34] [–1.36] 
Log(Assets) 0.044 0.062 
 [1.00] [1.39] 
Volatility 5.009 –0.005 
 [1.01] [–0.00] 
ROA  –2.068*** 
  [–3.03] 
Debt/Assets  –0.270 
  [–0.73] 
Old CEO  0.006 
  [0.05] 
   
Observations 3,410 3,371 
R-squared 0.0132 0.0177 
Industry FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 




CEO turnover and improvements of TFP  
This table presents the estimates for the specification ∆𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 +
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ⋅ Γ + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. ∆ is the first-difference operator. Turnover is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
experiences a CEO turnover in the year and zero otherwise. In Model 2 we further include a Turnover dummy for 
the year 𝑡 − 3. The sample consists of firms in the sample of Table 4, for which Execucomp data are available. 
Firm fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables ∆TFP ∆TFP 
      
Turnover𝑡−1 0.006 0.006 
 [1.08] [1.01] 
Turnover𝑡−2 0.013** 0.012** 
 [2.39] [1.98] 
Turnover𝑡−3  0.004 
  [0.62] 
Log(Assets) –0.013** –0.008 
 [–2.57] [–1.61] 
Tobin’s q 0.039*** 0.047*** 
 [13.87] [15.86] 
Cash/Assets 0.084*** 0.081** 
 [2.85] [2.50] 
Debt/Assets –0.023 –0.022 
 [–1.40] [–1.27] 
R&D/Assets –0.721*** –0.660*** 
 [–4.46] [–3.93] 
   
Observations 22,537 19,858 
R-squared 0.081 0.082 
Firm FE Y Y 









Outputs, inputs, and TFP improvements 
This table presents panel regressions of revenue, operating, and labor expenses on stock price informativeness and other firm-level controls.  The operating cost is 
measured by SG&A (scaled by total assets), and the labor cost is measures by the wage expenses (xlr in Compustat). Stock price informativeness is measured by 
the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and stock price nonsynchronicity (PSI). In our regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI over the previous 
three years. The sample consists of firms in Compustat for which the stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 1994–2015. All specifications 
include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Log(Revenue) Log(Revenue) SG&A SG&A Log(LaborCost) Log(LaborCost) 
PIN 0.042***  –0.026***  –0.295***  
 [2.93]  [–3.89]  [–3.77]  
PSI  0.009***  –0.002**  –0.018* 
  [6.24]  [–2.34]  [–1.91] 
Log(Assets) 0.410*** 0.418*** –0.004* –0.004** 0.633*** 0.635*** 
 [56.46] [56.23] [–1.67] [–1.96] [27.85] [25.71] 
Tobin’s q 0.035*** 0.036*** –0.009*** –0.009*** –0.006 –0.007 
 [19.00] [18.79] [–11.50] [–11.42] [–0.72] [–0.88] 
Cash/Assets –0.321*** –0.329*** 0.027*** 0.031*** –0.18 –0.241* 
 [–18.10] [–18.35] [3.46] [3.91] [–1.43] [–1.92] 
Debt/Assets –0.086*** –0.088*** 0.012*** 0.012*** –0.186*** –0.219*** 
 [–7.92] [–7.89] [2.86] [2.81] [–2.73] [–3.25] 
R&D/Assets 0.593*** 0.605*** 0.465*** 0.467*** 3.683*** 3.681*** 
 [10.81] [10.94] [13.45] [13.37] [5.03] [4.94] 
PP&E/Assets –0.094*** –0.104*** 0.011 0.015 0.452*** 0.426*** 
 [–3.77] [–4.02] [1.20] [1.49] [3.52] [3.23] 
Log(Revenue(t-1)) 0.498*** 0.494*** –0.017*** –0.017***   
 [55.61] [54.02] [–7.35] [–7.00]   
       
Observations 63,739 60,953 63,739 60,953 7,603 7,347 
R-squared 0.889 0.889 0.077 0.079 0.663 0.661 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Firm characteristics, price informativeness, and productivity  
This table presents estimates of panel regressions of TFP on the interactions of firm characteristics and stock price informativeness and other firm level control 
variables. The dependent variable in all specifications is TFP. Stock price informativeness is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and 
stock price nonsynchronicity (PSI). In our regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI over the previous three years. The sample consists of firms in Compustat for 
which the stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 1994–2015. All controls used in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are included, but for brevity 
their coefficients are not displayed. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Firm characteristic High assets Firm age Diversified Business risk 
Firm characteristic x PIN –0.167*** 
 
–0.013***  –0.144***  5.950***  
 [–3.25] 
 
[–6.25]  [–2.85]  [4.22]  
Firm characteristic x PSI  –0.008*  –0.001***  –0.007*  0.580*** 
 
 
[–1.88]  [–5.38]  [–1.88]  [5.51] 
PIN 0.335***  0.453***  0.298***  0.089*  
 [8.42]  [9.98]  [7.66]  [1.68]  
PSI  0.022***  0.034***  0.023***  0.001 
  [6.47]  [8.34]  [6.57]  [0.16] 
Firm characteristic 0.058*** 0.035** –0.002** –0.003*** –0.002 –0.017 –3.568*** –3.663*** 
 [3.74] [2.44] [–2.15] [–2.77] [–0.16] [–1.39] [–8.57] [–9.86] 




Observations 61,363 58,700 61,045 58,402 47,428 45,620 51,377 49,212 
R-squared 0.193 0.191 0.195 0.194 0.204 0.202 0.200 0.199 
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 





Financial constraints, price informativeness, and productivity 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions of TFP on the interactions of financial constraint measures and stock price informativeness and other firm-level 
control variables.  We use four financial constraint measures: no-dividend dummy, Whited and Wu index, no bond rating dummy, and Kaplan-Zingales index. The 
dependent variable in all specifications is TFP. Stock price informativeness is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and stock price 
nonsynchronicity (PSI). In our regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI over the previous three years. The sample consists of firms in Compustat for which the 
stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 1994–2015. All controls used in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (Panel A) are included, but for brevity 
their coefficients are not displayed. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fin. constraint No dividend WW index Bond rating KZ index 
PIN x Fin. const. 0.119***  0.705***  0.108**  0.005  
 [2.66]  [3.05]  [2.18]  [0.31]  
PSI x Fin. const.  0.010***  0.043**  0.008*  0.002* 
  [3.02]  [2.07]  [1.73]  [1.89] 
PIN 0.151***  0.381***  0.145***  0.214***  
 [4.26]  [4.90]  [3.86]  [7.54]  
PSI  0.009**  0.023***  0.010**  0.017*** 
  [2.56]  [3.63]  [2.44]  [5.62] 
Fin. const. –0.010 –0.006 1.122*** 1.244*** 0.017 0.025 –0.022*** –0.026*** 
 [–0.77] [–0.54] [12.69] [14.01] [1.05] [1.60] [–5.06] [–6.64] 
         
Observations 57,394 54,834 56,774 54,229 50,783 48,497 52,524 50,119 
R-squared 0.205 0.204 0.219 0.213 0.198 0.197 0.215 0.215 
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Product market competition, stock price informativeness, and productivity 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions of TFP on the interactions of product market competition measures 
and stock price informativeness and other firm level control variables.  Product market competition is measured by 
product similarity, product market fluidity, and TNIC HHI. The text-based network industry classification is used to 
construct these measures, which are available at the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library. In the tests, dummy variables for 
high competition are defined based on these competition measures: High similarity, High fluidity, and Low HHI, 
which are based on the median of the relevant measures in a year. The dependent variable in all specifications is TFP. 
Stock price informativeness is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and stock price 
nonsynchronicity (PSI). In our regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI over the previous three years. The sample 
consists of firms in Compustat for which the stock price informativeness measures are available for the years 1994–
2015. All controls used in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (Panel A) are included, but for brevity their coefficients are not 
displayed. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Competition Measure Low HHI High similarity High fluidity 
Competition x PIN 0.111***  0.091*  0.044  
 [2.81]  [1.75]  [0.87]  
Competition x PSI  0.010***  0.008**  0.006* 
  [3.31]  [1.97]  [1.69] 
PIN 0.301***  0.319***  0.336***  
 [8.98]  [9.20]  [9.83]  
PSI  0.023***  0.025***  0.026*** 
  [7.22]  [7.77]  [8.27] 
Competition –0.022** –0.017** –0.027** –0.022** –0.036*** –0.036*** 
 [–2.26] [–2.41] [–2.14] [–2.19] [–3.17] [–4.15] 
       
Observations 46,848 44,780 46,848 44,780 43,421 41,490 
R-squared 0.363 0.360 0.362 0.360 0.371 0.368 
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Corporate governance and the role of stock price informativeness 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions of TFP on the interactions of corporate governance measures and 
stock price informativeness and other firm-level control variables.  The strength of corporate governance is measured 
by a high institutional ownership dummy (based on median in a year), the number of blockholders (logarithm), and 
the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The dependent variable in all specifications is TFP. Stock price 
informativeness is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and stock price nonsynchronicity 
(PSI). In our regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI over the previous three years. The sample consists of firms 
in Compustat for which the stock price informativeness measures and the governance measures are available for the 
years 1994–2015. All controls used in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (Panel A) are included, but for brevity their 
coefficients are not displayed. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance measure High inst. ownership Log(N_blockholders) G-index 
Governance x PIN 0.147**  0.138**  –0.051***  
 [2.15]  [2.18]  [–3.62]  
Governance x PSI  0.020***  0.016***  –0.000 
  [3.89]  [3.62]  [–0.30] 
PIN 0.160***  0.080  0.597***  
 [2.73]  [1.00]  [4.22]  
PSI  0.016**  0.006  0.012 
  [2.56]  [0.87]  [0.78] 
Governance –0.005 –0.003 –0.062*** –0.058*** 0.001 –0.009 
 [–0.37] [–0.31] [–4.96] [–6.66] [0.17] [–1.49] 
 
      
Observations 22,286 21,229 22,286 21,229 15,328 14,817 
R-squared 0.224 0.223 0.226 0.224 0.214 0.211 
Other controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 







Alternative efficiency measures 
This table presents panel regressions of different measures of productivity/efficiency on stock price informativeness and other firm-level controls. The measures 
of productivity/efficiency in Columns 1 to 10 are from Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2016). TFP Growth (TFP Gr) in Columns 11 and 12 is from Chun, Kim, and 
Morck (2011). Stock price informativeness is measured by the probability of information-based trading (PIN) and stock price nonsynchronicity (PSI). In our 
regressions, we use the average PIN or PSI across the previous three years. The sample consists of firms in Compustat for which the stock price informativeness 
measures are available for the years 1994–2015. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Sales/BV Sales/BV Sales/VAIP Sales/VAIP COGS/Emp COGS/Emp ROA ROA Loss Loss TFP Gr TFP Gr 
PIN 0.043**  0.203*  4.738  0.055***  –0.581***  0.088***  
 [2.07]  [1.90]  [0.67]  [5.77]  [–2.97]  [3.16]  
PSI  0.012***  0.074***  –1.769***  0.009***  –0.136***  0.026*** 
  [5.55]  [4.27]  [–2.62]  [9.26]  [–7.62]  [8.00] 
Log(Assets) –0.550*** –0.532*** –0.971*** –0.866*** 55.509*** 54.090*** 0.022*** 0.028*** –0.477*** –0.538*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 
 [–50.59] [–49.39] [–26.58] [–15.42] [21.19] [19.94] [6.74] [10.76] [–15.91] [–16.78] [14.30] [14.25] 
Tobin’s q 0.013*** 0.014*** –0.007 –0.029*** 2.887*** 2.837*** 0.011* 0.018*** –0.686*** –0.676*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 [7.62] [7.93] [–1.07] [–2.77] [7.13] [6.99] [1.73] [15.26] [–28.46] [–27.80] [10.67] [10.44] 
Cash/Assets –0.397*** –0.397*** –1.135*** –1.286*** –19.307*** –20.782*** 0.079*** 0.071*** –1.734*** –1.743*** 0.296*** 0.288*** 
 [–19.65] [–19.83] [–12.47] [–9.16] [–3.32] [–3.49] [5.33] [6.89] [–11.01] [–10.86] [9.82] [9.28] 
Debt/Assets –0.067*** –0.064*** 1.245*** 0.433** –18.142*** –17.451*** –0.243*** –0.249*** 4.054*** 4.089*** –0.313*** –0.315*** 
 [–3.64] [–3.54] [9.21] [2.12] [–4.01] [–3.76] [–12.25] [–11.90] [34.04] [33.32] [–12.77] [–12.36] 
R&D/Assets 0.652*** 0.691*** 1.209*** 0.898 58.200*** 55.236*** –0.793*** –0.796*** 15.034*** 14.831*** –1.880*** –1.866*** 
 [8.37] [8.82] [2.72] [1.19] [2.78] [2.63] [–14.62] [–14.90] [23.12] [22.69] [–9.52] [–9.41] 
Cash flows 0.946*** 0.944*** –2.873*** –2.412***         
 [30.47] [30.16] [–15.63] [–7.85]         
Log(Sales), lag 0.442*** 0.433*** 0.864*** 0.880***         
 [38.60] [37.73] [24.42] [16.30]         
Log(Employees)     –113.898*** –112.793***       
     [–26.24] [–25.48]       
             
Observations 63,739 60,955 63,739 60,955 63,740 60,956 63,740 60,956 43,480 41,413 53,458 50,959 
R-squared 0.47 0.466 0.108 0.034 0.288 0.284 0.102 0.152 0.152 0.154 0.069 0.071 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
